Sovereign Credit Ratings, Transparency and International Portfolio Flows by Gande, Amar & Parsley, David
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Sovereign Credit Ratings, Transparency
and International Portfolio Flows
Amar Gande and David Parsley
Southern Methodist University, Vanderbilt University
February 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21118/
MPRA Paper No. 21118, posted 7. March 2010 02:57 UTC
  
 
Sovereign Credit Ratings, Transparency and International Portfolio Flows 
 
 
February 2010 
 
 
 Amar Gande David Parsley 
 Cox School of Business Owen Graduate School of Management 
 Southern Methodist University Vanderbilt University 
 Dallas, Texas  75275 Nashville, Tennessee  37203 
 214.768-1945 615.322-0649 
 agande@cox.smu.edu dparsley@owen.vanderbilt.edu 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the response of equity mutual fund flows to sovereign rating changes in a wide 
sample of countries during the crisis prone years from 1996-2002. We find that Sovereign 
downgrades are strongly associated with outflows of capital from the downgraded country 
while improvements in a country’s sovereign rating are not associated with discernable 
changes in equity flows. Transparency, as proxied by the level of corruption matters: more 
transparent (i.e., less corrupt) countries experience smaller outflows around downgrades. 
Moreover, abnormal flows around downgrades are consistent with a ‘flight to quality’ 
phenomenon. That is, less corrupt non-event countries are net recipients of capital inflows, 
and these inflows increase with the severity of the cumulative downgrade abroad. The results 
remain after controlling for country size, legal traditions, market liquidity, crisis versus non-
crisis periods. Taken together, the results suggest that increasing transparency could mitigate 
some of the perceived negative effects often associated with global capital flows.  
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“…transparency and the fight against corruption are essential to tackling the root causes of many 
challenges”   
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, January 27, 2004 
 
 “…certain structures and systems can make government actions more transparent. Corruption is 
deterred because it is more difficult to hide.” 
    Susan Rose-Ackerman, 1996 
 
1. Introduction 
It is easy to understand why sovereign credit rating changes receive prominent 
coverage in the financial press. Typically, the yield on sovereign debt provides the benchmark 
for all other debt in an economy. Hence market reactions reflect the anticipated impact of 
ratings revisions throughout the economy. That is, since the primary data on factors affecting 
a sovereign’s credit worthiness, such as tax collections, government spending, economic 
growth, the level of foreign exchange reserves, and net exports are generally known at the time 
of a rating change, a market response to a sovereign rating change would seem to be prima facie 
evidence that rating changes contain new information.1  
The purpose of this study is to explore these market reactions by focusing on their 
impact on international portfolio capital flows. Note that even though news announcements 
may elicit price changes, they need not induce capital flows. Recent research however, 
provides several plausible justifications for a capital flows response. First, several theoretical 
models suggest a role for portfolio rebalancing in crisis propagation (e.g., Pavlova and 
Rigobon, 2006, Pavlova and Rigobon, 2005, and Kodres and Pritsker, 2002). Indeed, rating 
agencies have been accused of exacerbating boom and bust cycles in capital flows to emerging 
economies.  
Hence, we devote considerable attention to potential asymmetric effects (i.e., 
downgrades versus upgrades) of ratings changes, following findings by Gande and Parsley 
(2005), and others, of asymmetric effects of rating changes on prices of sovereign debt. 
Johnson et al. (2000), provide a corporate finance rationale for such findings. In their model, 
worsening economic prospects in a country result in more expropriation by managers and 
thus lead to a larger fall in asset prices. Their model predicts this effect will be amplified in 
countries with weaker corporate governance, and by extension, in less transparent, more 
                                                 
1 In addition to cases where rating agencies may have access to information not publicly available, market 
participants may also perceive that rating agencies possess a comparative advantage in synthesizing 
macroeconomic data (despite widely noted crisis prediction failures) due to their global focus and continuity of 
coverage and analysis.  
  2 
corrupt countries. From a different perspective, Brennan and Cao (1997) present a model 
where domestic investors possess an information advantage relative to foreign investors. In 
their model, portfolio allocation decisions based on expectations of risk and return will be 
revised as a result of public announcements due to a revision in expectations. Since the 
revision is greater for the less well-informed investors, the effect will be more pronounced in 
countries with higher information asymmetries. Hence, in addition to documenting a portfolio 
flow response to rating events, our study places special emphasis on understanding the cross-
sectional variation in observed flows associated with rating changes.  
Specifically, we address several key questions. First, do portfolio capital flows respond 
to ratings changes, and is that response consistent with existing evidence from studies looking 
only at price, or interest rate effects alone? Second, is the effect similar (i.e., symmetric) for 
upgrades and for downgrades? Third, we test whether the observed pattern of response is 
plausibly related to information asymmetries by relating portfolio flows to a measure of 
transparency2, such as country-specific perceived corruption levels.3 Since corruption is illegal 
and therefore often conducted in secret, the reliability of information (as well as its 
distribution) surrounding economic transactions will be lower in more corrupt environments. 
That is, more corrupt countries will typically have lower transparency and a corresponding 
higher degree of information asymmetries between local and international investors. A testable 
implication is that news, e.g., a sovereign rating change (which is essentially news about an 
economy’s fundamentals), will have greater impact in less transparent, more corrupt 
economies where agents are poorly informed about the fundamentals. In consequence, a 
rating change in a more corrupt economy will induce relatively more capital flows since the 
revision in expectations is correspondingly greater. We also ask whether less corrupt countries 
are less vulnerable to bad news (e.g., downgrades). Since the quality and quantity of 
information is likely to be higher in less corrupt countries, we hypothesize that rating 
announcements should be less informative and hence induce relatively smaller portfolio 
adjustments for less corrupt countries relative to more corrupt countries. Finally, we explore 
whether more transparent (i.e., less corrupt) non-event countries benefit from bad news 
abroad by attracting portfolio flows away from countries experiencing downgrades. Finally, 
                                                 
2  Recent evidence suggests that transparency is an important dimension in explaining capital flows and 
susceptibility to financial crises, especially in emerging markets.  For example, the International Monetary Fund 
(2001) notes that a “lack of transparency was a feature of the buildup to the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 and of the 
emerging market crises of 1997-98.” 
3 There is a growing recognition and awareness of the economic costs of corruption (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993, Mauro (1995), Tanzi (1998), Wei (2000)). See Section 2.4 for details. 
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since the sample period brackets several crisis episodes, we test whether the response 
systematically varies between crisis and non-crisis periods. 
The primary data set we employ is a monthly panel of mutual fund equity positions 
covering 85 countries during the seven years 1996-2002 encompassing a string of crises in 
Asia, Russia, and Latin America. By the end of our sample, there were 724 active funds with 
assets totaling $138 billion (see Table 1). We match these holdings to sovereign credit rating 
changes, and a host of country-specific data as additional controls in our regressions, such as 
country type (developed versus emerging); a country’s legal origin (common law versus civil 
law) and rule of law tradition (see, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997, 
1998, 1999); the liquidity of its equities market (see, Henry, 2000); the size of the real 
economy; or the level of a country’s sovereign rating.  Most of our analysis is conducted at the 
country level.  However, since the raw data are reported at the fund-level, we check whether 
the results are driven by fund size, domicile, or fund investment strategy (international, global, 
etc.).   
Our findings can be briefly summarized. First, we find that changes in sovereign credit 
ratings represent new information to capital markets, as evidenced by a non-zero response of 
portfolio flows to rating changes. We find that the flow response is asymmetric: Positive 
rating events lead to no statistically significant abnormal capital flows, whereas negative rating 
events are associated with economically and statistically significant equity outflows. For 
example, a one-notch downgrade is associated with a contemporaneous outflow of $89.3 
million, or equivalently 5.5% of the end of prior month’s country allocation (i.e., fund asset 
positions cumulated across funds invested in a country) from the downgraded country. 
Second, we find that, as hypothesized, the capital outflow from more transparent (i.e., less 
corrupt) countries is much reduced around downgrades. In fact, lower corruption fully offsets 
the effect of a downgrade on capital flows. For example, a one-notch downgrade of a less 
corrupt country is associated with a statistically insignificant contemporaneous outflow.  
Third, interestingly, we find that more transparent (i.e., less corrupt) non-event 
countries are net recipients of capital inflows, and that these inflows increase with the extent 
of the bad news abroad. For example, a one-notch aggregate downgrade in event countries is 
associated with $26.6 million inflow, or equivalently 0.8% of the end of prior month’s country 
allocation into a less corrupt non-event country during the same month as that of the 
downgrade.  
  4 
All of the above results are robust to controlling for country size, legal traditions, 
market liquidity, crisis versus non-crisis periods, and are invariant to different assumptions 
regarding the within-month distribution of equity flows, monthly predicted benchmark flows, 
or persistence of equity flows.  
Importantly, our results show that transparency (i.e., corruption) has an independent, 
statistically significant and economically meaningful effect on portfolio flows even after 
controlling for the legal origin (e.g., common law versus civil law). That is, corruption is not 
subsumed by the legal origin. Moreover, while legal origin is exogenous, improving corruption 
(say, through greater public disclosure, or enactment and enforcement of new laws) is an 
endogenous choice for any country. An important policy implication of our results is that 
improving transparency could be beneficial to a sovereign in terms of smaller outflows around 
negative news (such as downgrades) domestically, and in attracting larger inflows around 
negative news abroad. At a broader level, improving transparency could mitigate some of the 
widely perceived negative effects of greater financial market integration (such as sudden-stops 
and capital flight), and promote financial development.  
The next section provides some background, while Section 3 describes the data we 
employ. Section 4 presents our findings and Section 5 concludes.  
2. Brief review of related studies 
This section provides a brief description of several key areas of research that provide 
motivation for this study.  
2.1. Law and finance 
Research stressing the roles of incentives, institutions, and legal traditions in economic 
outcomes provides a natural background for our study. In an influential series of papers (e.g., 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997, 1998, 1999), the authors conclude that 
legal origin (e.g., common law versus civil law) substantively accounts for cross-country 
differences in the financial contracting environment, shareholder protection, financial market 
development, and even the quality of government. Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) even 
suggest that inherited institutions (e.g., from colonizers) cannot easily be replaced by legal 
reform. Others, such as, Rajan and Zingales (2003), argue that inherited institutions cannot 
explain changes in countries’ relative outcomes over time. For example, the authors point out 
that despite France’s civil law tradition, financial development in 1913 was higher in France 
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than in the United States. These shifts suggest that factors that can be changed, (e.g., 
transparency) could be important.  
As noted in the introduction, our results indicate that a country’s transparency (i.e., 
corruption) has an independent (i.e., is not subsumed by the legal origin), statistically 
significant and economically meaningful effect on portfolio flows around rating changes.  
2.2. International portfolio flows 
International portfolio flows are of interest due to their influence on market efficiency, 
future growth, and investment, especially in emerging markets.  For example, Griffin, Nardari 
and Stulz (2004) document that unexpectedly high worldwide or local stock returns lead to 
daily net equity inflows into small countries (such as emerging markets), Li, Morck, Yang, and 
Yeung (2004) find that greater capital market openness is associated with a higher level of 
stock market efficiency (e.g., higher firm specific variation of stock returns), and Calvo and 
Reinhart (2001) suggest that access to capital markets has become more important than 
independent monetary policy for emerging markets.  
Among existing studies of international portfolio flows, early work (primarily using 
data from developed markets) considers whether portfolios are ‘optimally’ diversified (e.g., 
Grauer and Hakansson 1987, Tesar and Werner 1995). These studies find considerable scope 
for further gains from international portfolio diversification. Despite this ‘home-bias’, 
researchers find that U.S. investors tend to acquire foreign stocks when foreign returns are 
high – especially in large equity markets, e.g., Bohn and Tesar (1996). Moreover, Bohn and 
Tesar find that such ‘return-chasing’ underperforms a strategy of holding a market-weighted 
portfolio of foreign equities.  
Other studies focus on information asymmetries between foreign and domestic 
investors. Kang and Stulz (1997) find that foreign investment in Japanese equities is 
concentrated in the largest firms, which is consistent with foreign investors having relatively 
less information about small firms than local investors. Brennan and Cao (1997) show that 
when domestic investors possess an information advantage over foreign (e.g., U.S.) investors 
about the domestic market, U.S. investors tend to use a momentum strategy since they, being 
less well-informed, revise their prior beliefs more than the domestic investors in the foreign 
market.  
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More recently, Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001) examine the evidence of 
momentum strategies (i.e., inflows increase subsequent to high returns and vice versa) in 
emerging markets using daily portfolio flows covering flows into and out of 44 countries 
during the period mid-1994 through 1998. The authors corroborate earlier evidence of 
momentum, and importantly, find that flows statistically significantly affect future returns. 
Hence, contemporaneous interest rate effects may only provide a partial view, as they could be 
influenced by past portfolio flows. This finding motivates the approach we take in this paper. 
Finally, Gelos and Wei (2005) study how transparency affects herding and cross-
country portfolio allocation by mutual funds. They find that herding is more prevalent in less 
transparent countries, and such countries are underweighted in international portfolios (i.e., 
receive less investment from international funds). The authors also find some evidence that 
less transparent countries experience larger outflows during crises. Results from crisis periods, 
while interesting, do not necessarily extend to other settings, such as ratings downgrades, since 
downgrades do not systematically predict or even precede a crisis.  For example, Radelet, 
Sachs, Cooper and Bosworth (1998) argue that the sovereign credit rating agencies failed to 
predict the onset of the Asian financial crisis and may have even exacerbated it by 
downgrading countries after the crisis began. Hence, we examine portfolio flows around 
sovereign credit rating changes in both crisis and non-crisis periods. Furthermore, we examine 
which non-event countries benefit in terms of attracting portfolio flows away from a 
downgraded country, a ‘spillover’ aspect that is not examined in Gelos and Wei (2005).  
2.3. Cross-market contagion and spillovers 
Further motivation for this study comes from the extensive empirical literature 
demonstrating transmission of shocks across markets and asset classes (e.g., debt rating 
changes on stock markets)4. Recent theoretical models suggest a role for portfolio rebalancing 
in crisis propagation (e.g., Pavlova and Rigobon, 2006, Pavlova and Rigobon, 2005, and 
Kodres and Pritsker, 2002). Rating changes on corporate (i.e., non-sovereign) bonds have 
been shown to be associated with significant announcement effects on stock prices. For 
example, Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) analyze the effect of bond rating agency 
announcements on U.S. stock prices. These authors find differential impacts of upgrades 
                                                 
4 See Forbes and Rigobon (2002) for a discussion of methodological issues involved in measuring cross-market 
contagion. Also, see Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) who propose a multinomial logistic regression approach to 
measure contagion. 
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based on the grade (e.g., investment versus non-investment) of the bond being rated and on 
the direction of the rating change (upgrade versus downgrade).  
In an international context, Rigobon (2002) examines the impact of an upgrade in 
sovereign credit rating of Mexico from non-investment grade to investment grade in 2000 and 
shows a statistically significant change in the propagation of shocks between Mexico and 
several Latin American countries around the time the upgrade was announced. In addition, 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) focus on 16 emerging markets and ask whether changes in 
sovereign credit ratings contribute to market instability. They find evidence of cross-country 
contagion, particularly during crisis times and among neighbor countries.  
2.4. Corruption 
There is a growing recognition and awareness of the economic costs of corruption 
(e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, and Mauro, 1995). In a recent study, Tanzi (1998) documents 
that, despite increased global attention, corruption has likely become more prevalent in recent 
decades. A much discussed case in point is the recent East Asian financial crisis, where 
corruption, weak corporate governance, and insider dealing are the primary consensus 
explanations for its severity according to Radelet, Sachs, Cooper and Bosworth (1998). Given 
that countries have more influence over policies impacting transparency and domestic 
corruption (e.g., through standards, legislation, and enforcement), than say, the overall size of 
their economy, financial market liquidity, or which legal system they inherited, the prevalence 
of corruption is somewhat puzzling.5  
Recent empirical studies have demonstrated an inverse relationship between 
corruption and aggregate investment and economic growth, public investment in 
infrastructure and in education, and significantly, that corruption tilts the composition of capital 
flows away from longer term foreign direct investment toward shorter term flows (e.g., 
Mauro, 1995, Tanzi, 1998, Wei 2000). 6 This latter impact of corruption suggests our emphasis 
in this paper. Specifically, we investigate whether the impact of ratings changes varies with the 
level of corruption in an economy. Our findings include specific news announcements in both 
crisis and non-crisis periods, and we provide new results on the impact of corruption on 
cross-country portfolio shifts.  
                                                 
5 Formal models of the persistence of corruption do exist however, see, e.g., Mauro (2004). 
6 As noted by Tanzi (1998), an extensive public sector facilitates, but is not sufficient for corruption to have 
negative effects on investment and growth. 
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3. Data 
We use a three-dimensional monthly panel of portfolio holdings of stock funds that 
invest globally. The data set is commercially available from eMergingPortfolio.com and 
represents approximately 34% of total portfolio flows to emerging markets (see Gelos and 
Wei (2005) who also use this dataset for additional details).7 The panel contains a mixture of 
fund types, e.g., global, international, regional, and single country funds in the data set. Table 1 
lists the country coverage and the number of funds reporting for each as of December 2002. 
Importantly, the data identifies monthly (end-of-month) holdings, by fund, in 85 countries 
world wide. The data set begins January 1996 and ends December 2002 (84 months total). At 
the beginning of the sample the data set contains 368 funds with assets totaling $113 billion; at 
the end of 2002, there are 724 funds, with a total of $138 billion under management, and in 
total has 340,428 positive fund-country-month observations.  
We examine all sovereign rating changes made by the three principal sovereign rating 
agencies. Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s Investor Service are widely regarded as the 
two major sovereign rating agencies, with Fitch Investor Service also frequently mentioned. It 
is well known that ratings are highly correlated across agencies. As an alternative to replicating 
each aspect of our analysis on data from each rating agency, we test for the existence of a 
leader/follower relationship among these agencies. The statistical test is an extension of that in 
Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001), who find that ‘lead’ equity analysts consistently have the 
greatest market impact. We describe the details of the Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) leader-
follower ratio (LFR) test and our adaptation of it, in Appendix A. The results indicate that 
S&P is the lead rating agency. This conclusion remains unchanged whether we restrict the 
sample to the 85 countries in this study, or if we include all countries rated by at least two 
rating agencies (i.e., not limited to the 85 countries in Table 1), and whether we consider the 
entire history of sovereign ratings from 1941-2003, or if we restrict the sample to the sample 
period used in this study (1996-2002).8  Hence we focus our subsequent analysis on ratings 
announcements by S&P. 
Additionally, we use the country-specific time series of corruption indices provided by 
Transparency International. All existing indexes of transparency and corruption are based on 
                                                 
7 Another data set on capital flows is the U.S. Treasury data on international capital flows. However, the well-
documented transactional and custodial biases of the Treasury data preclude their use in this study (see 
http://www.treas.gov/tic/faq2.html#q4). The data set we use here does not have these biases.  
8 The historical sovereign ratings dataset starts from January 1, 1941 for S&P (United States), February 05, 1949 
for Moody’s (United States), and August 10, 1994 for Fitch (Austria). 
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international comparisons (surveys) of perceptions of e.g., the extent of bribery, red tape, 
public and private sector transparency and accountability, and judicial and public sector 
malfeasance. Quantifying these subjective and/or illegal practices is achieved via surveys of 
corporate representatives with international experience concerning their impressions of the 
extent of corruption, transparency, etc. We use Transparency International’s corruption 
perceptions index (CPI) because: it is a composite measure based on multiple information 
providers; it covers multiple aspects of transparency and corruption; it is well known; and it is 
available for a large (and growing) number of countries on an annual basis since 1995.9  In 
2003 for example, the Transparency International combined information from 17 independent 
sources (e.g., the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World Bank, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and 
Columbia University) to produce a single ranking. An important feature of the CPI is that 
year-to-year comparisons are made on the basis of the country’s score, and thus are unaffected 
by changes in the number of countries in the annual rankings. The number of countries 
ranked by Transparency International has grown from 41 in 1995 to 133 today.  
We also use other country specific and time series macroeconomic data including: (1) 
country index returns from Datastream, MSCI, and S&P/IFC;  (2) the International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook 2003 database; and (3) and the S&P/IFC Global Stock 
Markets Factbook (2003).  
Finally, we include a host of country specific and time-invariant data that have been 
suggested by related studies, e.g., the legal and institutional market characteristics as suggested 
in La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., (1997, 1998, 1999), Pistor, 
Raiser, and Gelfer (2000), and Henry (2000). 
4. Empirical specification and results 
This section is divided into four parts. In the first part, we discuss issues related to the 
measurement of capital flows from the underlying portfolio holdings data. Since rating 
changes can impact the valuation of existing country allocations (especially in emerging 
markets) as well as flows, we construct measures of flows that account for these valuation 
changes. The second part lays out the estimation strategy and discusses our main results. The 
                                                 
9 Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index has been widely used in recent studies, e.g., Alesina 
and Weder (2002), and, Treisman (2000). As Alesina and Weder (2002) point out, alternative rankings compiled 
by different institutions using very different methodologies and sources are highly correlated. Current and past 
CPI rankings, as well as further information on their construction, is available at:  
http://wwwuser.gwdg.de/~uwvw/corruption.cpi_olderindices.html.  
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third part discusses our results on the impact of a country’s transparency (i.e., corruption 
ranking) on the estimated response of portfolio flows to a sovereign credit rating change. This 
section concludes with additional robustness tests. 
4.1. Rating events 
In defining a rating event, we follow Gande and Parsley (2005) and consider changes 
in the stated grade given to a country (represented by the letter-grade D thru AAA) as well as 
the information in secondary announcements that qualify a country’s stated grade. For 
example, Standard & Poors frequently revises sovereigns on its ‘credit outlook’ a few months 
prior to an actual upgrade of a country’s stated grade. We term the combined rating (stated 
rating plus any credit outlook information) as the country’s ‘comprehensive’ credit rating 
(CCR), and study equity flows in response to changes in the CCR. Procedurally, we 
numerically code the letter ratings on a scale from 0 (lowest) thru 21 (highest). Similarly, we 
code the credit outlook on a scale between –1 to +1, in five increments based on the five 
distinct credit outlook categories S&P uses. We sum these two to produce the comprehensive 
credit rating. Appendix B presents a tabulation of the construction of the CCR. Thus each 
country has a rating for each time period, and multiple events during a month are summed; 
our interest is any change in the aggregate comprehensive credit rating of a sovereign and how 
this impacts capital flows.  
Table 2 presents a summary of the individual country rating changes that occurred 
during the 1996-2002 period. Overall, there are 247 rating events during this time period. Of 
these, 115 are upgrades (positive change in the CCR from the prior month) – while 132 are 
downgrades (negative change in CCR from the prior month). The countries with the largest 
number of changes during the sample are: Indonesia (16), Turkey (15), Argentina, Russia, and 
Malaysia (each with 11 events).  
Figure 1 presents a monthly view of the time series distribution of rating changes, 
aggregated across all types of changes (upgrades and downgrades) and across all countries. 
Figures 2 and 3 present the information for upgrades and downgrades separately. Across all 
countries, there are very few months with no ratings activity, and activity appears to have both 
increased and become more variable over time. Downgrades appear to be more clustered, i.e., 
occurring in several countries simultaneously (or within the month), and are concentrated 
more toward the latter part of the sample. As pointed out by other authors, e.g., Radelet and 
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Sachs (1998), the Asian Crisis seems not to have been preceded by an increase in ratings 
activity.  
4.2. Measuring flows 
The dependent variable in our regressions is the amount of portfolio equity capital 
flowing into or out of each country each month. The primary question we address is whether 
changes in sovereign credit ratings impact these flows. The raw data from 
eMergingPortfolio.com Fund Research (EPFR) records each fund’s holdings (i.e., asset 
positions) at the end of each month, on a country by country basis. From these holdings data, 
EPFR computes and markets various measures of cross border capital flows to investment 
professionals. In this study, we use the raw data provided by EPFR on equity fund holdings. A 
snapshot of the data is presented in Table 1, which summarizes the number of active funds 
(i.e., with a positive asset position in equities) in each country, and the aggregate country 
allocation (i.e., sum across funds active) as of December 2002, the end of our sample period. 
The table suggests substantial variation along several dimensions: in number of countries; in 
number of active funds within each country; and, in total allocation in each country.  
Typically estimates of monthly capital flows from asset positions are computed as the 
difference between asset positions at the end of the period (At) and those at the beginning of 
the period (At-1), compounded for the ex post (realized) return (mt), as in equation 1 below.  
][* tttt mAAFlow   11  (1)  
 Since the event (rating change) is likely to have a market impact (which we verify 
below in Section 4.2.1), we also estimate flows based on the market return absent the rating 
change, i.e., an ex ante (expected) return E(mt) rather than an ex post (realized) return mt as 
shown in equation (2) below. 
)]([* tttt mEAAFlow   11  (2) 
We refer to the Flowt implied by equation 1 as the explicit flow, and the Flowt implied 
by equation 2 as the comprehensive flow, which can be interpreted as a measure of the 
economic impact of a rating change. Though equation 2 is more comprehensive in the sense 
that it accounts for market effects of ratings changes explicitly, we also report an initial 
benchmark specification using the explicit flow computed as in equation 1.   
  12 
We next discuss the way we measure the expected return, E(mt), in equation 2, after 
first verifying that rating changes do have an economically and statistically significant market 
impact on country index returns.  
4.2.1. Market impact of rating changes 
In this section we use an event study framework to demonstrate the impact of 
sovereign rating changes on country index returns. Empirically, we estimate the average effect 
of a rating change on a country index returns ( t ) as follows. Formally, define 
)( .., tititi mEm  , where ti ,  is the abnormal return in country i, tim ,  is the observed 
logarithmic return  1titi PP ,,ln  on the local market index (Pi,t, expressed in U.S. dollars), and 
)( .timE  is the expected return on the i
th market’s index as predicted from the (OLS) 
coefficients estimated in the market model regression. That is, tiiti mktmE  ˆˆ)( .  , where 
mktt is the return on a world market index.  
Following Gelos and Wei (2005), we assume that in any given country, funds hold that 
country’s index, since the data set provides asset positions in each country at a given point in 
time (month end) and not individual fund returns. The coefficients ii  ˆ,ˆ  are ordinary least 
squares (OLS) coefficients from the market-model regression during the estimation time 
period. We follow Brown and Warner (1985), and test the null hypothesis that the abnormal 
return for any month t is equal to zero (H0: t =0) using the ratio of the average abnormal 
return to its estimated time-series cross-sectional dependence adjusted standard error, i.e.,  
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where Nt  is the number of countries whose abnormal returns are available at month t. For 
tests over multi-period intervals, e.g., [-1,+1], the test statistic is the ratio of the cumulative 
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average abnormal return (CAR) to its estimated time-series cross-sectional dependence 
adjusted standard error for the multi-period interval, i.e.,  
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Appendix C reports our estimates of t , the average effect of a ratings change on the 
local market index, using monthly index returns. For upgrades, only two months (-1, and 0) 
appear statistically significant, and the CAR rises by 7.5% . For downgrades, five of the six 
months [-5, 0] are statistically significant at the 1% level, and in the same two month time 
frame leading up to a downgrade, the market index drops by 11.5%.10   
4.2.2. Flow measures 
Before moving to estimation of the flow response to a rating change in the next 
section, we discuss an additional measurement detail, namely to what extent are the results 
influenced by the implicit assumption concerning the timing of the flow during the month. 
That is, because our raw data reflects monthly (end of month) fund investment position data 
(At), our estimate of flows (Flowt) depends on what we assume about how the flows are 
distributed within the month. To address this issue, we consider several estimates of monthly 
flows, based on different assumptions as to their timing within each month. In all, we consider 
results using six different assumptions regarding the intra-month flow. For example, flows 
could occur on the last day of the month (Flow measure 1, same as in equation 2), on the first 
day of the month (Flow measure 2), in the middle of the month (Flow measure 3), or distributed 
in equal amounts at various times during the month (Flow measures 4-6). Details of the 
construction of these measures are provided in Appendix E.  
4.3. Measuring flow responses to rating events 
                                                 
10 We find evidence of a similar market impact using daily data – though due to data availability we are able to do 
such analysis only for a sub-sample of 54 countries. Appendix D and Figures 4 and 5 summarize the results. 
Interestingly, there appears to be some anticipation of the event for both positive and negative rating changes. 
However, the effect is economically and statistically larger for downgrades. According to the summary at the 
bottom of Appendix D, the CAR surrounding downgrades is more than twice as large as that for upgrades in 
absolute value. This impression is also confirmed in Figures 4 and 5.  
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As the first step in the empirical analysis, we ask whether flows respond to the type of 
a ratings event (positive or negative). Specifically, we examine whether the flows during event 
months are economically and statistically different from flows in non-event months, defined 
as (a) months where no rating change event occurred in the event country, and more 
conservatively, or (b) months where no ratings event occurred in any of the sample countries 
(that is, we consider flows in each event country i in months where there was no ratings 
activity in any country). We initially measure flows by F6 as described in Appendix E, which 
assumes the monthly flows are distributed in equal daily amounts.11  We subsequently consider 
other flow measures (see Section  4.5 for details).  
We examine flow responses to the magnitude of a rating change using the stricter 
requirement (i.e., using condition b) by pooling the data for all event countries (i), at each 
event month (t) into two sub-samples, one for positive events, and another for negative 
events. For ease of interpretation, we normalize the sign of Eventi,t to be the same for both 
negative and positive regressions. That is, Eventi,t is defined as the absolute value of the 
aggregate change in comprehensive credit rating across all days in a month for country, i.12  
We stack the event data (positive or negative) with non-event data (defined initially as months 
where no ratings event occurred in any of the sample countries) to run OLS regressions. By 
definition, the Eventi,t is zero for non-event data.  
Our regression equation is given in equation 5, and we present two specifications in 
Table 3. We report estimates from equation 5 for both upgrades and downgrades beginning 
with a benchmark regression that includes only the event country’s comprehensive credit 
rating (CCRt-1) as a control variable since it has been noted by other authors, e.g., Cantor and 
Packer (1996) that a country’s credit rating succinctly summarizes the comparative 
macroeconomic environment of a country. Hence, initially the vector Xk in equation 5 
contains controls for the lagged CCR. Appendix F provides more detail on sources and 
construction of the variables in Xk.  
. , ,,1, iXEventFlow ti
k
kktiti     (5) 
                                                 
11 Flow measure 6 also approximates the behavior of fund managers sensitive to investing a large lump sum of 
capital, especially in emerging markets (which constitute a large portion of our sample – 61 of the 85 countries) 
which may have limited ‘market depth’ and ‘liquidity’.  
12 This does not affect our interpretation of the coefficients since we run the positive and negative analysis 
separately. 
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In the second regression specification of Table 3, we control for important differences 
among countries, e.g., factors such as size of the economy, market liquidity, and legal origin. 
Hence, the vector Xk in equation 5 now contains controls for the level of the event country’s 
comprehensive credit rating (CCR), gross domestic product, dummies for 
emerging/developed status, origin of legal system (i.e., common law versus other forms), rule 
of law, liquidity, an indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods, and year dummies. Many 
of these factors have been central to recent contributions concerning the economics of 
financial markets in emerging countries (e.g., Henry, 2000, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1997, 1998, 1999). Moreover, capital flows have been the center of global 
attention following the succession of national crises during the time period under study. 
Hence, given the time frame and cross country breadth of the current data set, the inclusion 
of these controls seems warranted. Subsequently, we consider additional explanatory variables 
as well as different definitions of the dependent variable. 
Clearly, portfolio flows appear to respond to rating changes, and the effect is 
asymmetric. That is, positive rating events (in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3), have no 
discernable impact on portfolio flows (the coefficient on Event  is not statistically different 
from zero). Negative rating events, in contrast, are associated with portfolio outflows, i.e., the 
coefficient has the anticipated sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level for negative 
rating events. According to the table, on average, a one-notch downgrade in the sovereign 
credit rating is associated with a $115.4 million outflow (see column 4) of capital from the 
country experiencing a negative rating event. 
In Table 4, we present the results as a percentage of the previous month’s country 
allocation, i.e., we scale the dependent variable by the aggregate (i.e., summed across all funds 
investing in a country) asset position. On average, a one-notch downgrade in a country’s 
sovereign credit rating is associated with an outflow of 6.9% (see column 4) of the previous 
month’s country allocation. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained in Table 3, 
and the explanatory power is higher than in Table 3. Hence, we will report percentage flows 
for the remainder of the paper, though we do report dollar amounts in appendices. 
The results so far utilize a non-event sample defined as flows in months where no 
ratings event occurred in any of the sample countries. In Appendix G we repeat the analysis in 
Table 3, defining the non-event sample for each country as flows in months where no rating 
event occurred in the event country. As shown in the table, the results are qualitatively 
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unchanged using this looser benchmark. Hence, in the remainder of the paper we will focus 
on the stricter benchmark of non-event data. 
For comparison, we replicate Table 4 using the explicit flow (computed using equation 
1) rather than the comprehensive flow (equation 2), measured as a percentage of the previous 
month’s country allocation. The results are presented in Appendix H. As expected, the results 
are qualitatively similar, albeit the statistical significance is marginally lower.  
Thus we conclude that rating changes have an asymmetric effect. One possible 
explanation for the direction-specific impact of rating changes on flows is that rating agencies 
may be reluctant to lowering the sovereign credit rating or the credit outlook due to a fear of 
losing continued access to critical information, such as the level of foreign currency reserves, 
etc., which may be privately observed by the foreign governments.13 
4.4. Information Asymmetries 
Based on the importance and increasing attention paid to governance and public 
accountability issues in recent years, we analyze the link between rating changes and 
transparency. Since we find no discernable portfolio flows around positive rating events, we 
primarily concentrate the discussion on rating downgrades. Specifically, we investigate 
whether more transparent (i.e., less corrupt) countries are less vulnerable to bad news, such as 
rating downgrades. Since the amount and quality of information is likely to be higher in less 
corrupt countries, we hypothesize that downgrades should be less informative and hence 
induce smaller portfolio adjustments for less corrupt countries.  
To test this hypothesis, we define a low corruption country as having a ranking of 7.5 
or above (out of 10) on Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index (CPI). We 
take a literal reading of the rankings so that a country enters the sample only after the country 
has been ranked by Transparency International.14  In principle, the time-series dimension 
allows each country’s score to reflect whether corruption improved or worsened year by year.  
                                                 
13 Asymmetric effects have been documented in studies of interest rate effects in both sovereign debt markets 
(Gande and Parsley, 2005) and in domestic asset markets (Goh and Ederington, 1993). A reluctance to 
downgrade has been well documented in the literature on equity analysts. For example, Womack (1996) 
documents that “… new buy recommendations occur seven times more often than sell recommendations, 
suggesting that brokers are reluctant to issue sell recommendations”.  
14 However, in order to maintain our cross-section of 85 countries, we also considered an alternative ranking that 
used the first ranking available to ‘back-cast’ a country’s ranking to the beginning of the data set. For example, if 
a country first appears in 1998, we used its 1998 corruption score for 1996 and 1997. In practice, this had little 
impact on the results; hence we report only the results with the literal ranking. Our results are also unaffected by 
redefining high corruption as the top 25% of distribution of rankings. 
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The regression results are summarized in Table 5. The asymmetric pattern of portfolio 
response to ratings changes is confirmed. For example, a one-notch downgrade is associated 
with a contemporaneous outflow of 5.5% (see column 3) of the end of prior month’s country 
allocation (i.e., fund asset positions cumulated across funds invested in a country) from the 
downgraded country. In Appendix I, we report the results in dollar terms. The results are 
qualitatively similar, e.g., a one-notch downgrade is associated with a contemporaneous 
outflow of $89.3 million from the downgraded country. 
The marginal effect of the corruption variable interacted with the Eventi,t variable is 
positive for downgrades (and statistically insignificant for upgrades), suggesting that an 
additional beneficial effect of higher transparency (i.e., lower corruption) is that it can dampen 
the capital flight associated with a negative rating event. In fact, lower corruption fully offsets 
the effect of a downgrade on capital flows, e.g., a one-notch downgrade of a less corrupt 
country is associated with a statistically insignificant contemporaneous outflow. This result is 
not simply re-stating that less corrupt countries have higher credit ratings; the result here 
suggests that changes in ratings have larger effects in more corrupt countries. The other control 
variables used in the regressions in Appendix I and Table 5 have signs and significance levels 
comparable to those in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. 
We explore the impact of corruption levels further by examining spillover effects of 
flows, i.e., flows into and out of other (i.e., non-event) countries surrounding ratings events. In 
particular, in Table 6 we report regressions (in percentage terms as in Table 5) for the sample 
of non-event countries. In this case, Event is defined as the absolute aggregate change (from 
the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating across all event countries during a 
month. For non-event countries, the Event variable is not statistically significant, regardless of 
the specification. The variables we are most interested in however are those relating to 
corruption. In particular, we find that less corrupt countries are recipients of higher levels of 
capital inflows surrounding downgrades. The marginal effect of the corruption variable 
interacted with the Eventi,t variable is positive for downgrades in Table 6, suggesting that capital 
is flowing out of countries being downgraded (based on evidence in Table 5), and into less 
corrupt non-event countries. For example, a one-notch aggregate downgrade in event 
countries is associated with an inflow of 0.8% (see column 3) of the end of prior month’s 
country allocation (statistically significant at the 5% level) into a less corrupt non-event 
country during the same month as that of the aggregate downgrade.  As before, we report the 
results in Appendix J in dollar terms for non-event countries. The explanatory power is 
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higher, and the results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 6, e.g., a one-notch aggregate 
downgrade in event countries is associated with an inflow of $26.6 million inflow into a less 
corrupt non-event country during the same month as that of the aggregate downgrade.  
Overall our results can be summarized as follows: First, we find evidence of 
informational value in sovereign credit ratings – sovereign credit rating changes are associated 
with significant flows for the country experiencing a rating change. Second, this effect is 
asymmetric: Positive rating events have no discernable impact on portfolio flows, whereas 
negative rating events are associated with portfolio outflows. Third, we find that more 
transparent (i.e., less corrupt) countries experience less capital flight following downgrades. In 
fact, lower corruption fully offsets the effect of a downgrade on capital flows, i.e., for less 
corrupt countries the flow response is statistically insignificant. Finally, we find that more 
transparent (i.e., less corrupt) non-event countries are net recipients of capital inflows around 
downgrades, and that these inflows increase with the extent of the bad news abroad. 
4.5. Robustness checks 
Next we conduct several robustness checks to the core results in Tables 5 and 6.  
4.5.1. Global funds 
It may be argued that our results implicitly assume that every fund in our sample has 
the ability to shift its investment from one country to another. In fact however, some of the 
funds are single-country funds. In Tables 7 and 8, we consider this issue by aggregating the 
flows of only the global funds (i.e., those invested in more than one country) rather than all 
funds at a country-level. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Tables 5 and 6.   
4.5.2. Flow measures 
We check whether our results depend on the particular flow measure we have chosen 
from those described in Appendix E. Specifically, one may argue that since the exact date 
(within a month) of deployment of funds flow into the equities of a country is unobservable, 
an unbiased estimate of the date of deployment of funds flow is the middle of the month, the 
relevant flow measure may not be F6. Hence we repeat the regressions in Tables 5 and 6 by 
replacing the dependent variable flow measure 6 with flow measure 3 (and similarly the lagged 
dependent variable). The results, presented in Tables 9 and 10, are again qualitatively 
unchanged. In addition, we repeat the regressions in Tables 5 and 6 with other flow measures 
(not reported here) and the results remain qualitatively similar.   
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4.5.3. Outliers 
We investigate whether our results are driven by outliers. In Tables 11 and 12 we run 
the regressions in Tables 5 and 6 after excluding approximately one percent of our sample. 
Again, the results are qualitatively the same as before, although here the statistical significance 
and overall fit of the regression model improves. Hence, we conclude that our results are not 
driven by these types of measurement and data issues.   
4.5.4. Country clustering effects 
We examine whether our results are robust to clustering effects, for example, based on 
country of investment. We run the regressions in Tables 5 and 6 after controlling for country 
clustering effects and find that the results reported in Appendixes K and L are robust.  
4.6. Alternative explanations 
We next examine whether alternative explanations rationalize our empirical evidence. 
4.6.1. Rating changes surrounding investment grade category 
It is easy to envision that all rating changes are not equal.  One could imagine that it is 
much worse to go down one-notch from investment grade (BBB and above) to speculative 
grade (below BBB) than being down one-notch from the top end of the investment grade.  
Similarly, a one-notch upgrade from speculative grade to investment grade category could be 
much better than a one-notch upgrade from the bottom end of the speculative grade.  In 
other words, our results in Table 5 may be entirely driven by rating changes surrounding the 
boundary between investment grade and speculative grade categories. To address this issue, 
we augment the regression in Table 5 with an indicator variable that measures an upgrade 
from speculative grade to investment grade category in case of positive rating changes, and an 
analogously defined indicator variable for negative rating changes that measures a downgrade 
from investment grade into speculative grade category.  The results reported in Appendix M 
are qualitatively unchanged. 
4.6.2. Non-linearity of credit rating 
The empirical evidence, for example, in Table 5 is based on an implied linear 
relationship between flows and the level of credit rating.  To test whether our results are 
robust to non-linearity in the level of credit rating, we follow Reisen and von Maltzan (1998) 
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and utilize the logistic transformation of the credit rating in place of the level of the credit 
rating.  The results reported in Appendix N are qualitatively similar to those in Table 5.  
4.6.3. Other factors 
In addition, since the raw data are reported at the fund-level, we check and find that 
our results are robust to additional control variables, such as fund size, domicile, or fund 
investment strategy (international, global, etc.).  Finally, we tried other proxies of transparency, 
such as ICRG measure, and enforcement of insider trading laws and found the results to be 
qualitatively unchanged.  
5. Conclusions 
Using monthly data from 85 countries we find that sovereign rating changes are 
valuable in terms of their information. We find that rating changes are associated with 
significant changes in contemporaneous portfolios flows. This finding is robust to the 
different ways of measuring capital flows that we consider in this study. We find that the 
effects are asymmetric; sovereign downgrades are strongly associated with outflows of capital 
from the country being downgraded while improvements in a country’s sovereign rating are 
not associated with discernable changes in equity flows. High levels of transparency (i.e., low 
levels of corruption) however, are associated with a statistically significant reduction in the 
responsiveness of equity flows to downgrades. Moreover, observed flows are consistent with a 
flight to quality phenomenon. That is, aggregating rating changes across event countries, we 
find that more transparent (i.e., less corrupt) non-event countries are net recipients of capital 
inflows, and that these inflows increase with the severity of the aggregate downgrade abroad. 
These results do not appear sensitive to country size, legal traditions, market liquidity, or crisis 
versus non-crisis periods, and are robust to different assumptions regarding the within-month 
distribution of equity flows, monthly predicted benchmark flows, or persistence of equity 
flows.  
Our analysis has several implications related to the impact and value of sovereign 
credit rating agencies, as well as (a) how countries are likely to be affected, (b) which subsets 
are most impacted, and (c) the ultimate influence on the cost of capital to firms. At a broader 
level, it is clear that the impact itself can be affected by public policy – such as encouraging 
more competition, regulation, and transparency. In particular, our results suggest that 
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improving transparency (i.e., reducing corruption) could mitigate some of the widely perceived 
negative effects of greater financial market integration.  
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Table 1:  Number of funds per country and aggregate country allocation, December 2002 
 
The following table lists the number of active funds (i.e., with a positive asset position) in each country (reported by 
eMergingPortfolio.com), and the aggregate country allocation (i.e., sum across all active funds) as of December 2002, 
the end of our sample period.  
 
 
  Country Active Funds Allocation ($m)   Country Active Funds Allocation ($m) 
1 Argentina 104 148.11 44 Malawi  6 0.12 
2 Australia 140 3,060.22 45 Malaysia 284 1,997.75 
3 Austria 45 172.72 46 Mauritius 4 2.05 
4 Bahrain 1 1.11 47 Mexico 255 7,087.56 
5 Bangladesh 2 1.25 48 Morocco 13 20.58 
6 Belgium 42 606.02 49 Namibia  0 0.00 
7 Bolivia  0 0.00 50 Netherlands 96 4,578.26 
8 Botswana 3 2.42 51 New Zealand 69 235.78 
9 Brazil 255 5,530.88 52 Nigeria 10 11.86 
10 Bulgaria  2 0.20 53 Norway 50 643.92 
11 Canada 83 2,611.30 54 Oman 7 7.29 
12 Chile 148 986.05 55 Pakistan 8 6.80 
13 China 361 4,006.46 56 Panama  7 0.66 
14 Colombia 14 19.97 57 Papua New Guinea  0 0.00 
15 Cote d'Ivoire  0 0.00 58 Peru 99 158.23 
16 Croatia 79 227.75 59 Philippines 128 457.57 
17 Cyprus 1 0.29 60 Poland 163 1,245.80 
18 Czech Republic 149 534.52 61 Portugal 45 134.59 
19 Denmark 63 731.43 62 Romania 8 39.10 
20 Ecuador 4 6.66 63 Russia 210 3,595.92 
21 Egypt 39 131.86 64 Saudi Arabia  1 1.56 
22 Estonia 47 114.12 65 Singapore 290 2,160.73 
23 Finland 97 1,842.04 66 Slovakia 5 1.28 
24 France 105 5,359.96 67 Slovenia 7 8.96 
25 Germany 97 3,167.03 68 South Africa 147 3,179.94 
26 Ghana 5 30.05 69 Spain 92 2,178.63 
27 Greece 37 121.91 70 Sri Lanka 21 43.51 
28 Hong Kong 365 6,596.51 71 Sweden 77 1,565.67 
29 Hungary 179 1,410.68 72 Switzerland 101 4,320.48 
30 India 296 5,421.07 73 Taiwan 362 5,464.45 
31 Indonesia 202 1,156.66 74 Tajikistan  0 0.00 
32 Ireland 49 436.92 75 Thailand 291 1,896.07 
33 Israel 154 586.50 76 Tunisia 3 0.80 
34 Italy 91 1,517.97 77 Turkey 149 885.18 
35 Jamaica  0 0.00 78 Ukraine 8 1.64 
36 Japan 146 11,761.16 79 United Kingdom 106 13,447.53 
37 Jordan 3 10.15 80 United States 69 8,794.93 
38 Kazakhstan  1 1.45 81 Uruguay  0 0.00 
39 Kenya 2 0.71 82 Venezuela 72 52.09 
40 Korea, South 415 15,233.12 83 Vietnam  11 10.84 
41 Latvia  0 0.00 84 Zambia  0 0.00 
42 Lebanon 4 1.37 85 Zimbabwe 4 5.30 
43 Lithuania 7 2.76     
 Total 724* 137,794.82 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
* many funds invest in more than one country – this number represents funds that are active in at least one country. 
  
 
Table 2:  Number and type of rating changes, by country 
 
The following table lists the number of sovereign credit rating changes by Standard & Poors’ (S&P) during 1996-
2002 by country, and by type: upgrades (pos.), downgrades (neg.), and the total for each of the 85 countries for 
which we have country specific fund investment position data. See Appendix B for a more complete description of 
positive and negative rating events. 
  
 Country Pos. Neg. Total Country Pos. Neg. Total  
 1 Argentina 2 9 11 44 Malawi 0 0 0 
 2 Australia 1 0 1 45 Malaysia 5 6 11 
 3 Austria 0 0 0 46 Mauritius 0 0 0 
 4 Bahrain 0 0 0 47 Mexico 4 1 5 
 5 Bangladesh   0 0 0 48 Morocco 0 1 1 
 6 Belgium 0 0 0 49 Namibia 0 0 0 
 7 Bolivia 0 2 2 50 Netherlands 0 0 0 
 8 Botswana 0 0 0 51 New Zealand 2 1 3 
 9 Brazil 2 4 6 52 Nigeria 0 0 0 
 10 Bulgaria 2 0 2 53 Norway 0 0 0 
 11 Canada 2 0 2 54 Oman 2 1 3 
 12 Chile 1 0 1 55 Pakistan 3 6 9 
 13 China 0 1 1 56 Panama 1 2 3 
 14 Colombia 0 4 4 57 Papua New Guinea 1 4 5 
 15 Cote d’Ivoire 0 0 0 58 Peru 2 3 5 
 16 Croatia 1 1 2 59 Philippines 3 4 7 
 17 Cyprus 0 2 2 60 Poland 4 1 5 
 18 Czech Republic 0 1 1 61 Portugal 1 0 1 
 19 Denmark 1 0 1 62 Romania 4 3 7 
 20 Ecuador 2 1 3 63 Russia 6 5 11 
 21 Egypt 0 1 1 64 Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 
 22 Estonia 1 0 1 65 Singapore 0 0 0 
 23 Finland 2 0 2 66 Slovakia 5 2 7 
 24 France 0 0 0 67 Slovenia 1 0 1 
 25 Germany 0 0 0 68 South Africa 2 1 3 
 26 Ghana 0 0 0 69 Spain 1 1 2 
 27 Greece 4 0 4 70 Sri Lanka 0 0 0 
 28 Hong Kong 2 2 4 71 Sweden 2 0 2 
 29 Hungary 5 0 5 72 Switzerland 0 0 0 
 30 India 2 4 6 73 Taiwan 0 2 2 
 31 Indonesia 4 12 16 74 Tajikistan 0 0 0 
 32 Ireland 2 0 2 75 Thailand 2 4 6 
 33 Israel 1 2 3 76 Tunisia 1 0 1 
 34 Italy 1 0 1 77 Turkey 6 9 15 
 35 Jamaica 1 1 2 78 Ukraine 0 1 1 
 36 Japan 0 4 4 79 United Kingdom 0 0 0 
 37 Jordan 2 2 4 80 United States 0 0 0 
 38 Kazakhstan 4 1 5 81 Uruguay 1 5 6 
 39 Kenya 0 0 0 82 Venezuela 2 6 8 
 40 Korea, South 5 4 9 83 Vietnam 0 0 0 
 41 Latvia 1 0 1 84 Zambia 0 0 0 
 42 Lebanon 2 5 7 85 Zimbabwe 0 0 0 
 43 Lithuania 1 0 1  
      Total 115 132 247 
 
  
 
Table 3:  Asymmetric effects of rating changes  
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,6 ,,1, iXEventF ti
k
kktiti     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country i (the event country) at time t. 
Here, we report flow measure F6, which assumes the monthly flows are distributed in equal daily amounts 
throughout the month. For each country with a rating event, we include in the regressions flows in event months 
and flows in non-event months where there was no change in the comprehensive credit rating (event) for any of the 
countries in our sample. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing the flow measure) is based on 
a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country on the returns on a world index during an 
estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an event month. Event is defined as the 
absolute change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating in country i. A positive rating event is 
defined as a positive change in the comprehensive credit rating from the prior month. A downgrade, or negative 
rating event, is defined as a decline in the comprehensive credit rating from the prior month. Regressions include 
variables for the lagged comprehensive credit rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal system 
(i.e., common law versus other forms), rule of law, GDP, liquidity, and an indicator variable corresponding to crisis 
periods. See Appendices E and F for a complete description of variable construction. The superscript a indicates 
statistical significance at the 1% level using robust standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant 64.062 1.158 -20.469 -0.139 70.933 1.031 253.597 1.374 
Event 9.348 0.489 -2.292 -0.105 -113.917 -4.930a -115.385 -4.109a 
Comprehensive credit  0.034 0.007 2.154 0.235 -1.359 -0.186 -1.795 -0.261 
     rating (lagged) 
Emerging   17.147 0.261   -158.427 -1.272 
Common law   -38.953 -0.589   -23.868 -0.370 
Rule of law   9.082 0.531   5.459 0.318 
GDP   0.201 0.980   0.033 0.554 
Liquidity   89.208 1.593   46.112 0.993 
Crisis   38.812 0.608   -114.874 -0.998 
Year Dummies no yes no yes 
Adjusted R2 -0.007 0.023 0.059 0.119 
Observations 250 250 267 267 
 
  
 
Table 4:  Asymmetric effects of rating changes (percent) 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,)/6( ,,11,, iXEventCAF ti
k
kktititi     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country i (the event country) at time t. 
Here, we report flow measure F6 deflated by the lagged country allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position cumulated 
across all funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that the monthly flows are distributed in equal daily 
amounts throughout the month. For each country with a rating event, we include in the regressions flows in event 
months and flows in non-event months where there was no change in the comprehensive credit rating (event) for 
any of the countries in our sample. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing the flow measure) 
is based on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country on the returns on a world index 
during an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an event month. Event is 
defined as the absolute change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating in country i. A positive 
rating event is defined as a positive change in the comprehensive credit rating from the prior month. A downgrade, 
or negative rating event, is defined as a decline in the comprehensive credit rating from the prior month. Regressions 
include variables for the lagged comprehensive credit rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal 
system (i.e., common law versus other forms), rule of law, GDP, liquidity, and an indicator variable corresponding to 
crisis periods. See Appendices E and F for a complete description of variable construction. The superscripts a and c 
indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 10% levels using robust standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant 0.058 1.955c 0.028 0.529 0.037 1.364 0.022 0.327 
Event 0.014 1.165 0.005 0.410 -0.073 -5.031a -0.069 -3.649a 
Comprehensive credit  -0.003 -1.339 -0.005 -1.861c -0.001 -0.473 -0.002 -0.826 
     rating (lagged) 
Emerging   0.022 0.919   0.016 0.403 
Common law   0.031 1.519   0.023 1.014 
Rule of law   0.015 1.737c   0.012 1.369 
GDP   0.000 -0.259   0.000 1.165 
Liquidity   0.003 0.344   0.001 0.162 
Crisis   0.025 0.813   -0.048 -1.165 
Year Dummies no yes no yes 
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.034 0.157 0.183 
Observations 250 250 267 267 
 
  
 
Table 5:  Asymmetric effects of rating changes and transparency (percent) 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,)/6( ,,11,, iXEventCAF ti
k
kktititi     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country i (the event country) at time t. 
Here, we report flow measure F6 deflated by the lagged country allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position cumulated 
across all funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that the monthly flows are distributed in equal daily 
amounts. For each country with a rating event, we include in the regressions flows in event months, and flows in 
non-event months where there was no change in the comprehensive credit rating (event) for any of the countries in 
our sample. Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the country’s corruption perceptions index (CPI) is 
greater than 7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing the flow measure) is based 
on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country on the returns on a world index during 
an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an event month. Event is defined as 
the absolute change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating in country i. A positive rating 
event is defined as an increase in the comprehensive credit rating, and a negative rating event occurs whenever the 
comprehensive credit rating declines from the prior month. Regressions include variables for lagged flow measure F6 
(percent), the lagged comprehensive credit rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal system (i.e., 
common law versus other forms), rule of law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive variable formed from the 
Transparency and Event variables, and an indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See Appendices E and F 
for a complete description of variable construction. The superscript a indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
using robust standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant 0.037 0.704 0.036 0.688 -0.003 -0.040 -0.008 -0.116 
Event 0.008 0.582 0.008 0.586 -0.055 -3.170a -0.055 -3.173a 
Comprehensive credit  -0.004 -1.343 -0.004 -1.344 -0.002 -0.898 -0.002 -0.916 
     rating (lagged) 
Lagged Flow (percent) 0.088 0.723 0.088 0.725 0.080 1.240 0.080 1.243 
Emerging 0.016 0.663 0.018 0.748 0.027 0.872 0.032 0.834 
Common law 0.024 1.034 0.023 1.089 0.021 0.922 0.020 0.925 
Rule of law 0.010 1.078 0.010 1.058 0.013 1.528 0.013 1.528 
GDP -0.000 -0.320 -0.000 -0.341 0.000 1.327 0.000 1.385 
Transparency -0.007 -0.238   -0.010 -0.382 
Transparency x Event 0.012 0.204 0.008 0.140 0.122 3.023a 0.119 3.180a 
Liquidity -0.006 -0.641 -0.006 -0.627 -0.006 -0.701 -0.006 -0.698 
Crisis 0.025 0.784 0.025 0.782 -0.039 -1.038 -0.039 -1.035 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.024 0.187 0.191 
Observations 240 240 253 253  
 
  
 
Table 6:  Non-event country effects and transparency (percent) 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,)/6( ,11,, jXEventCAF tj
k
kkttjtj     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country j (a non-event country) at time 
t. Here, we report flow measure F6, deflated by the lagged country allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position 
cumulated across all funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that the monthly flows are distributed in 
equal daily amounts. For each rating event, we include in the regressions flows in the event months, and flows in 
non-event months. Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the country’s corruption perceptions index 
(CPI) is greater than 7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing the flow measure) 
is based on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country on the returns on a world index 
during an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an event month. Event is 
defined as the absolute aggregate change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating across all 
event countries i ( j). A positive rating event is defined as one if the aggregate ratings change is positive (and zero 
otherwise), and a negative rating event is defined as one if the aggregate ratings change is negative (and zero 
otherwise). Regressions include variables for lagged flow measure F6 (percent), the lagged comprehensive credit 
rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal system (i.e., common law versus other forms), rule of 
law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive variable formed from the Transparency and Event variables, and an 
indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See Appendices E and F for a complete description of variable 
construction. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using robust 
standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant -0.002 -0.097 0.005 0.187 0.030 1.226 0.028 1.136 
Event -0.000 -0.051 -0.001 -0.414 -0.001 -0.590 -0.001 -0.467 
Comprehensive credit  -0.003 -2.497b -0.003 -2.394b -0.003 -2.283b -0.003 -2.309b 
     rating (lagged) 
Lagged Flow (percent) -0.004 -0.058 -0.005 -0.062 0.067 1.589 0.068 1.604 
Emerging 0.023 2.111b 0.014 1.203 -0.006 -0.449 -0.003 -0.218 
Common law 0.012 1.642 0.017 2.183b -0.004 -0.479 -0.006 -0.745 
Rule of law 0.008 2.073b 0.009 2.295b 0.009 2.185b 0.008 2.122b 
GDP -0.000 -0.828 -0.000 -0.753 -0.000 -0.366 -0.000 -0.354 
Transparency   0.037 2.107b   -0.015 -0.985   
Transparency x Event -0.006 -1.632 0.000 0.000 0.008 2.208b 0.006 1.915c 
Liquidity 0.001 0.341 0.001 0.188 0.002 0.461 0.002 0.499 
Crisis 0.033 3.525a 0.033 3.500a -0.002 -0.155 -0.002 -0.187 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.031 0.030 0.030 
Observations 1352 1352 1356 1356 
 
  
 
Table 7:  Asymmetric effects of rating changes and transparency (global funds, percent) 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,)/6( ,,11,, iXEventCAF ti
k
kktititi     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country i (the event country) at time t. 
Here, we report flow measure F6 deflated by the lagged country allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position cumulated 
across all global funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that the monthly flows are distributed in equal 
daily amounts. For each country with a rating event, we include in the regressions flows in event months, and flows 
in non-event months where there was no change in the comprehensive credit rating (event) for any of the countries 
in our sample. Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the country’s corruption perceptions index (CPI) 
is greater than 7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing the flow measure) is 
based on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country on the returns on a world index 
during an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an event month. Event is 
defined as the absolute change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating in country i. A positive 
rating event is defined as an increase in the comprehensive credit rating, and a negative rating event occurs whenever 
the comprehensive credit rating declines from the prior month. Regressions include variables for lagged flow 
measure F6 (percent), the lagged comprehensive credit rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal 
system (i.e., common law versus other forms), rule of law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive variable 
formed from the Transparency and Event variables, and an indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See 
Appendices E and F for a complete description of variable construction. The superscript a indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level using robust standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant  0.030 0.555 0.029 0.532 -0.017 -0.269 -0.025 -0.353 
Event  0.009 0.648 0.009 0.655 -0.051 -2.868a -0.051 -2.872a 
Comprehensive credit  -0.004 -1.253 -0.004 -1.255 -0.002 -0.668 -0.002 -0.689 
     rating (lagged)        
Lagged Flow (percent) 0.106 0.933 0.106 0.938 0.078 1.212 0.078 1.215 
Emerging 0.017 0.627 0.019 0.759 0.032 1.007 0.039 0.986 
Common law 0.025 1.052 0.023 1.067 0.022 0.913 0.021 0.910 
Rule of law 0.010 1.118 0.010 1.085 0.014 1.554 0.014 1.554 
GDP -0.000 -0.283 -0.000 -0.316 0.000 1.352 0.000 1.443 
Transparency -0.012 -0.360   -0.013 -0.503   
Transparency x Event 0.013 0.205 0.006 0.100 0.126 3.107a 0.122 3.234a 
Liquidity -0.006 -0.602 -0.006 -0.573 -0.006 -0.628 -0.006 -0.623 
Crisis 0.029 0.871 0.029 0.869 -0.041 -1.076 -0.041 -1.071 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.018 0.170 0.174 
Observations 240 240 253 253  
 
  
 
Table 8:  Non-event country effects and transparency (global funds, percent) 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,)/6( ,11,, jXEventCAF tj
k
kkttjtj     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country j (a non-event country) at time 
t. Here, we report flow measure F6, deflated by the lagged country allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position 
cumulated across all global funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that the monthly flows are distributed 
in equal daily amounts. For each rating event, we include in the regressions flows in the event months, and flows in 
non-event months. Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the country’s corruption perceptions index 
(CPI) is greater than 7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing the flow measure) 
is based on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country on the returns on a world index 
during an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an event month. Event is 
defined as the absolute aggregate change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating across all 
event countries i ( j). A positive rating event is defined as one if the aggregate ratings change is positive (and zero 
otherwise), and a negative rating event is defined as one if the aggregate ratings change is negative (and zero 
otherwise). Regressions include variables for lagged flow measure F6 (percent), the lagged comprehensive credit 
rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal system (i.e., common law versus other forms), rule of 
law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive variable formed from the Transparency and Event variables, and an 
indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See Appendices E and F for a complete description of variable 
construction. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using robust 
standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant -0.008 -0.325 -0.001 -0.036 0.023 0.916 0.020 0.815 
Event 0.000 0.154 -0.000 -0.199 -0.001 -0.637 -0.001 -0.504 
Comprehensive credit  -0.003 -2.215b -0.003 -2.111b -0.003 -1.902c -0.003 -1.930c 
     rating (lagged)        
Lagged Flow (percent)  0.013 0.177 0.012 0.171 0.067 1.609 0.068 1.626 
Emerging 0.024 2.212b 0.016 1.315 -0.002 -0.163 0.001 0.103 
Common law 0.013 1.688c 0.018 2.207b -0.005 -0.514 -0.007 -0.798 
Rule of law 0.007 1.944c 0.008 2.159b 0.008 2.042b 0.008 1.972b 
GDP -0.000 -1.031 -0.000 -0.974 -0.000 -0.471 -0.000 -0.456 
Transparency   0.036 2.022b   -0.016 -1.051   
Transparency x Event -0.007 -1.717c -0.001 -0.182 0.009 2.306b 0.006 1.971b 
Liquidity 0.003 0.974 0.003 0.833 0.003 0.686 0.003 0.727 
Crisis 0.036 3.895a 0.036 3.873a -0.001 -0.129 -0.002 -0.163 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.032 0.026 0.026 
Observations 1352 1352 1356 1356 
 
  
 
Table 9: Asymmetric effects of rating changes (flow measure 3, percent) 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,)/3( ,11,, iXEventCAF ti
k
kkttiti     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country i (the event country) at time t. 
Here, we report flow measure F3, deflated by the lagged country allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position cumulated 
across all funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that the monthly flows are distributed as a lump sum 
amount at the middle of a month. For each country with a rating event, we include in the regressions flows in event 
months, and flows in non-event months where there was no change in the comprehensive credit rating (event) for 
any of the countries in our sample. Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the country’s corruption 
perceptions index (CPI) is greater than 7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing 
the flow measure) is based on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country on the 
returns on a world index during an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an 
event month. Event is defined as the absolute change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating 
in country i. A positive rating event is defined as an increase in the comprehensive credit rating, and a negative rating 
event occurs whenever the comprehensive credit rating declines from the prior month. Regressions include variables 
for lagged flow measure F3 (percent), the lagged comprehensive credit rating, country status as emerging/developed, 
origin of legal system (i.e., common law versus other forms), rule of law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive 
variable formed from the Transparency and Event variables, and an indicator variable corresponding to crisis 
periods. See Appendices E and F for a complete description of variable construction. The superscript a indicates 
statistical significance at the 1% level using robust standard errors in a two-tailed test.   
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant 0.037 0.703 0.036 0.688 -0.003 -0.040 -0.008 -0.117 
Event 0.008 0.582 0.008 0.586 -0.055 -3.167a -0.055 -3.170a 
Comprehensive credit  -0.004 -1.344 -0.004 -1.346 -0.002 -0.902 -0.002 -0.920 
     rating (lagged)    
Lagged Flow (percent) 0.087 0.721 0.088 0.723 0.080 1.236 0.080 1.238 
Emerging 0.017 0.665 0.018 0.750 0.027 0.875 0.033 0.836 
Common law 0.024 1.035 0.023 1.089 0.021 0.924 0.020 0.926 
Rule of law 0.010 1.081 0.010 1.061 0.013 1.532 0.013 1.532 
GDP -0.000 -0.321 -0.000 -0.342 0.000 1.328 0.000 1.387 
Transparency -0.008 -0.240   -0.010 -0.384   
Transparency x Event 0.013 0.207 0.009 0.143 0.122 3.032a 0.120 3.189a 
Liquidity -0.006 -0.639 -0.006 -0.625 -0.006 -0.700 -0.006 -0.697 
Crisis 0.025 0.783 0.025 0.782 -0.039 -1.039 -0.039 -1.036 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.024 0.187 0.191 
Observations 240 240 253 253 
 
  
 
Table 10: Non-event country effects and transparency (flow measure 3, percent) 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,)/3( ,11,, jXEventCAF tj
k
kkttjtj     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country j (a non-event country) at time 
t. Here, we report flow measure F3, deflated by the lagged country allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position 
cumulated across all funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that the monthly flows are distributed as a 
lump sum amount at the middle of a month. For each rating event, we include in the regressions flows in the event 
months, and flows in non-event months. Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the country’s 
corruption perceptions index (CPI) is greater than 7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index (used in 
constructing the flow measure) is based on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country 
on the returns on a world index during an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 
represents an event month. Event is defined as the absolute aggregate change (from the previous month) in the 
comprehensive credit rating across all event countries i ( j). A positive rating event is defined as one if the aggregate 
ratings change is positive (and zero otherwise), and a negative rating event is defined as one if the aggregate ratings 
change is negative (and zero otherwise). Regressions include variables for lagged flow measure F3 (percent), the 
lagged comprehensive credit rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal system (i.e., common law 
versus other forms), rule of law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive variable formed from the Transparency 
and Event variables, and an indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See Appendices E and F for a 
complete description of variable construction. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels using robust standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant -0.002 -0.091 0.005 0.192 0.030 1.227 0.028 1.137 
Event -0.000 -0.056 -0.001 -0.419 -0.001 -0.594 -0.001 -0.471 
Comprehensive credit  -0.003 -2.499b -0.003 -2.396b -0.003 -2.284b -0.003 -2.310b 
     rating (lagged)        
Lagged Flow (percent) -0.004 -0.058 -0.005 -0.062 0.067 1.590 0.068 1.605 
Emerging 0.023 2.111b 0.014 1.202 -0.006 -0.448 -0.003 -0.216 
Common law 0.012 1.644 0.017 2.184b -0.004 -0.477 -0.006 -0.743 
Rule of law 0.008 2.070b 0.009 2.292b 0.009 2.185b 0.008 2.122b 
GDP -0.000 -0.830 -0.000 -0.756 -0.000 -0.366 -0.000 -0.354 
Transparency 0.037 2.104b   -0.015 -0.987   
Transparency x Event -0.006 -1.629 0.000 0.002 0.008 2.210b 0.006 1.915c 
Liquidity 0.001 0.339 0.001 0.187 0.002 0.460 0.002 0.499 
Crisis 0.033 3.525a 0.033 3.500a -0.002 -0.159 -0.002 -0.191 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.031 0.030 0.030 
Observations 1352 1352 1356 1356 
 
  
 
Table 11: Asymmetric effects of rating changes (excluding outliers, percent) 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
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The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country i (the event country) at time t. 
Here, we report flow measure F6 deflated by the lagged country allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position cumulated 
across all funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that the monthly flows are distributed in equal daily 
amounts. For each country with a rating event, we include in the regressions flows in event months, and flows in 
non-event months where there was no change in the comprehensive credit rating (event) for any of the countries in 
our sample. Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the country’s corruption perceptions index (CPI) is 
greater than 7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing the flow measure) is based 
on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country on the returns on a world index during 
an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an event month. Event is defined as 
the absolute change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating in country i. A positive rating 
event is defined as an increase in the comprehensive credit rating, and a negative rating event occurs whenever the 
comprehensive credit rating declines from the prior month. Regressions include variables for lagged flow measure F6 
(percent), the lagged comprehensive credit rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal system (i.e., 
common law versus other forms), rule of law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive variable formed from the 
Transparency and Event variables, and an indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See Appendices E and F 
for a complete description of variable construction. This table repeats the analysis in Table 5 excluding outliers – 
identified as those observations from the regressions in Table 5 associated with absolute studentized residuals greater 
than 2.5 (i.e., lower than -2.5 or higher than 2.5). The superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels using robust standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant 0.046 0.952 0.045 0.935 -0.009 -0.145 -0.008 -0.122 
Event -0.000 -0.059 -0.000 -0.047 -0.049 -3.010a -0.049 -3.012a 
Comprehensive credit  -0.002 -0.640 -0.002 -0.641 -0.001 -0.471 -0.001 -0.471 
     rating (lagged)         
Lagged Flow (percent) 0.161 2.674a 0.161 2.681a 0.122 2.063b 0.122 2.063b 
Emerging 0.005 0.190 0.007 0.291 0.021 0.696 0.020 0.534 
Common law 0.030 1.601 0.028 1.670c 0.009 0.439 0.009 0.455 
Rule of law 0.004 0.597 0.004 0.551 0.012 1.469 0.012 1.470 
GDP -0.000 -0.855 -0.000 -0.902 0.000 1.814c 0.000 1.751c 
Transparency -0.010 -0.339   0.002 0.063   
Transparency x Event 0.003 0.060 -0.002 -0.035 0.108 2.803a 0.109 3.102a 
Liquidity -0.000 -0.038 -0.000 -0.002 -0.007 -0.915 -0.007 -0.920 
Crisis 0.010 0.468 0.009 0.466 -0.032 -0.924 -0.032 -0.925 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.090 0.226 0.230 
Observations 232 232 245 245 
 
  
 
Table 12: Non-event country effects and transparency (excluding outliers, percent) 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
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The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country j (a non-event country) in 
month t with rating changes in event countries. Here, we report flow measure F6, deflated by the lagged country 
allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position cumulated across all funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that 
the monthly flows are distributed in equal daily amounts. For each rating event, we include in the regressions flows 
in the event months, and flows in non-event months. Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the 
country’s corruption perceptions index (CPI) is greater than 7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index 
(used in constructing the flow measure) is based on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a 
country on the returns on a world index during an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 
represents an event month. Event is defined as the absolute aggregate change (from the previous month) in the 
comprehensive credit rating across all event countries i ( j). A positive rating event is defined as one if the aggregate 
ratings change is positive (and zero otherwise), and a negative rating event is defined as one if the aggregate ratings 
change is negative (and zero otherwise). Regressions include variables for lagged flow measure F6 (percent), the 
lagged comprehensive credit rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal system (i.e., common law 
versus other forms), rule of law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive variable formed from the Transparency 
and Event variables, and an indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See Appendices E and F for a 
complete description of variable construction. This table repeats the analysis in Table 6 excluding outliers – identified 
as those observations from the regressions in Table 6 associated with absolute studentized residuals greater than 2.5 
(i.e., lower than -2.5 or higher than 2.5). The superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels using robust standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant  -0.007 -0.393 -0.004 -0.230 0.000 0.017 -0.001 -0.069 
Event -0.000 -0.171 -0.001 -0.527 0.001 0.345 0.001 0.689 
Comprehensive credit  -0.003 -3.016a -0.003 -2.952a -0.001 -1.074 -0.001 -1.207 
     rating (lagged)        
Lagged Flow (percent) 0.069 2.195b 0.070 2.227b 0.107 3.783a 0.109 3.838a 
Emerging 0.020 2.102b 0.015 1.699c 0.009 0.805 0.011 1.065 
Common law 0.009 1.388 0.013 2.052b 0.003 0.417 0.001 0.120 
Rule of law 0.008 2.522b 0.008 2.693a 0.006 1.811c 0.006 1.765c 
GDP -0.000 -0.964 -0.000 -0.915 -0.000 -0.503 -0.000 -0.509 
Transparency 0.020 1.772c   -0.012 -0.869   
Transparency x Event -0.002 -0.702 0.001 0.568 0.007 1.899c 0.005 1.766c 
Liquidity 0.005 1.833c 0.005 1.738c -0.001 -0.183 0.000 0.052 
Crisis 0.038 4.761a 0.039 4.851a -0.007 -0.811 -0.006 -0.669 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes  
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.075 0.064 0.062 
Observations 1320 1320 1317 1317 
 
  
 
Appendix A: Leader-follower ratio (LFR) 
This appendix describes the Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001), hereafter CDL, test for whether a particular rating 
agency (or equity analyst in their case) leads or lags other rating agencies in making rating change announcements. In 
their study of earnings forecasts by individual analysts in U.S. equity markets, CDL develop a methodology to rank 
analysts based on whether they lead or follow other analysts in announcing forecast revisions. We adapt their 
procedure to the case of sovereign rating changes, and compare the three principal sovereign credit rating agencies 
(S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch). The procedure identifies leaders by comparing the rating activity of other agencies (e.g., 
Moody’s, and Fitch) in the period before and after a rating change by a particular agency (say, S&P). Following CDL, 
we define )( 10 jikjik tt as the number of days by which forecast i  of other rating agencies (Moody’s and Fitch) precedes 
(follows) forecast k  of a selected rating agency (e.g., S&P). In our context we focus on the forecast of each of the 
other rating agencies immediately preceding or lagging forecast k of a selected rating agency (i.e., N=1 below). 
Aggregating over all rating announcements (k) of a selected rating agency, the time to the immediately preceding 
forecast across all other rating agencies, and across all countries (j), defines the cumulative lead-time for the selected 
rating agency, T0:   
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The cumulative lag-time, T1, for the given firm is defined similarly using 1ikt . That is,  
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Next, we form the leader-follower ratio (LFR) for a particular rating agency, as the ratio of aggregate lead time T0, to 
aggregate lag time, i.e.,  10 TTLFR  . This test statistic is distributed as F(2JNK, 2JNK), and since a lead rating agency 
systematically releases ratings changes before other agencies, the ratio will be greater than one. See CDL (2001) for 
additional details. We summarize the test for each of the three agencies (S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch) for four different 
samples. In column (a) we use only the 85 countries in Table 1 during the sample period 1996-2002, in column (b) 
we consider historical ratings data for the same 85 sample countries from 1941-2003, in column (c) we include 
ratings of all countries (i.e., not limited to the 85 countries in Table 1) during the sample period, and finally, in 
column (d) we use the historical ratings data for all countries from 1941-2003. P-values are given in parenthesis 
below the empirical LFR test statistic. The superscript b implies statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
  LFR Test Statistic and (p-value)  
Rating Agency: (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Standard & Poor’s 1.276 1.295 1.277 1.294 
 (0.025)b (0.015)b (0.025)b (0.015)b 
Moody’s 1.095 1.128 1.101 1.132 
 (0.232) (0.158) (0.219) (0.147) 
Fitch 0.954 1.012 0.977 1.033 
 (0.641) (0.462)  (0.570)  (0.396) 
 
  
 
 
Appendix B: Comprehensive credit rating 
This appendix describes the construction of the comprehensive credit rating (CCR) measure. The reported credit 
rating is assigned a numerical code from 0 thru 21 as indicated to obtain the explicit credit rating (ECR). Next, we 
add the reported information on the credit outlook (OL), coded from -1 to +1, to obtain the comprehensive credit 
rating (CCR), i.e., CCR = ECR + OL. For example, if a country is rated BB+ with stable credit outlook, its ECR and 
CCR are 11. If S&P revises the outlook to credit watch-negative. (from stable), the ECR is still 11. However, its CCR 
is 10.50. 
  
 Explicit Credit Rating 
Sovereign Rating ECR 
AAA 21 
AA+ 20 
AA 19 
AA- 18 
A+ 17 
A 16 
A- 15 
BBB+ 14 
BBB 13 
BBB- 12 
BB+ 11 
BB 10 
BB- 9 
B+ 8 
B 7 
B- 6 
CCC+ 5 
CCC 4 
CCC- 3 
CC 2 
C 1 
SD, D 0 
 
Credit Outlook  
 Add to ECR 
Positive 1 
Credit Watch-Developing 0.5 
Stable 0 
Credit Watch-Negative -0.5 
Negative -1 
 
  
 
 
Appendix C:  Monthly event study results 
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the effect of a sovereign credit rating change 
on portfolio flows. We compute the average abnormal returns (AR), i.e., t in equation (3) based on the market-
model adjusted method. That is, the monthly return based on a market-model regression using the World Market 
Index, is subtracted from the local country’s monthly index return as explained in Section 4.2.1. The returns are 
computed based on indices measured in U.S. dollars. The t-statistics of ARs and CARs are computed using the 
methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence in 
returns, where a, b, and c stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating changes Negative rating changes  
Month N AR T-stat Month N AR T-stat 
 -5 104 2.34% 1.538  -5 114 -3.64% -3.130a  
 -4 104 2.00% 1.316  -4 114 -1.57% -1.354 
 -3 104 2.38% 1.567  -3 114 -3.08% -2.649a 
 -2 104 1.66% 1.096  -2 114 -3.56% -3.063a 
 -1 104 3.57% 2.352b  -1 114 -6.35% -5.458a 
 0 104 3.95% 2.599a  0 114 -5.15% -4.426a 
 1 104 -0.22% -0.142  1 114 0.13% 0.112 
 2 104 2.31% 1.521  2 114 1.96% 1.686c 
 3 104 1.18% 0.778  3 114 -1.19% -1.025 
 4 104 0.10% 0.066  4 114 -1.16% -1.000 
 5 104 1.41% 0.931  5 114 1.36% 1.166 
 Months N ACAR T-stat Months N ACAR T-stat 
 (-5,+5) 104 20.68% 4.107a  (-5,+5) 114 -22.26% -5.771a 
 (-2,+2) 104 11.28% 3.321a  (-2,+2) 114 -12.97% -4.986a 
 (-1,+1) 104 7.30% 2.777a  (-1,+1) 114 -11.37% -5.642a 
 (-1, 0) 104 7.52% 3.501a  (-1, 0) 114 -11.50% -6.989a 
 (0,+1) 104 3.73% 1.737c  (0,+1) 114 -5.02% -3.051a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix D:  Daily event study results 
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the effect of a sovereign credit rating change 
on portfolio flows. We compute the average abnormal returns (AR), i.e., t in equation (3) based on the market-
model adjusted method. That is, the monthly return based on a market-model regression using the World Market 
Index, is subtracted from the local country’s monthly index return as explained in Section 4.2.1. The returns are 
computed based on indices measured in U.S. dollars. The t-statistics of ARs and CARs are computed using the 
methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence in 
returns, where a, b, and c stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test. 
 
 
Positive rating changes Negative rating changes  
Day N AR T-stat Day N AR T-stat 
 -10 107 -0.10% -0.479  -10 109 -0.24% -0.808 
 -9 107 0.39% 1.913c  -9 109 0.05% 0.170 
 -8 107 -0.02% -0.087  -8 109 -0.40% -1.323 
 -7 107 -0.02% -0.089  -7 109 -0.60% -1.995b 
 -6 107 0.11% 0.511  -6 109 -0.19% -0.649 
 -5 107 -0.09% -0.452  -5 109 -0.45% -1.504 
 -4 107 0.41% 1.982b  -4 109 -0.17% -0.580 
 -3 107 0.09% 0.452  -3 109 -0.92% -3.080a 
 -2 107 0.02% 0.120  -2 109 -0.94% -3.130a 
 -1 107 0.33% 1.604  -1 109 -0.79% -2.632a 
 0 107 0.88% 4.272a  0 109 -1.07% -3.574a 
 1 107 0.11% 0.550  1 109 -0.27% -0.886 
 2 107 -0.34% -1.653c  2 109 0.33% 1.098 
 3 107 -0.11% -0.538  3 109 0.96% 3.220a 
 4 107 -0.18% -0.894  4 109 0.13% 0.435 
 5 107 0.04% 0.194  5 109 0.12% 0.409 
 6 107 -0.25% -1.192  6 109 -0.18% -0.585 
 7 107 -0.02% -0.094  7 109 0.36% 1.210 
 8 107 0.11% 0.518  8 109 -0.30% -1.001 
 9 107 0.09% 0.460  9 109 0.10% 0.337 
 10 107 0.64% 3.120a  10 109 0.20% 0.679 
 Days N CAR T-stat Days N CAR T-stat 
 (-10,+10) 107 2.10% 2.230b   (-10,+10) 109 -4.25% -3.097a 
 (-5,+5) 107 1.16% 1.700c  (-5,+5) 109 -3.06% -3.083a 
 (-2,+2) 107 1.01% 2.188b  (-2,+2) 109 -2.73% -4.081a 
 (-1,+1) 107 1.32% 3.710a  (-1,+1) 109 -2.12% -4.095a 
 (-1, 0) 107 1.21% 4.155a  (-1, 0) 109 -1.86% -4.388a 
 (0,+1) 107 0.99% 3.409a  (0,+1) 109 -1.34% -3.154a 
 
 
  
 
 
Appendix E: Measures of international portfolio flows 
This appendix describes the construction of several different measures of monthly equity flows discussed in the text. 
The measures described here reflect different assumptions concerning the timing of the flows within the month – 
since our raw data reflect monthly (end of month) fund investment position data (At), and not the intra-month 
timing of flows (FNt). Empirically, we estimate fund flows based on differences in the fund investment position 
from the prior month, and on the estimated expected return on a market index (E(mt)). We estimate E(mt) by an 
event study approach, where the expected return on a market index (E(mt)) is obtained by regressing the country’s 
index returns on the returns on a world index using during a 60 month estimation period, i.e., from [-65,-6] where 
month 0 represents an event month. We consider several different flow measures for robustness.  Explicit flow 
measures based on mt can easily be derived by simply substituting E(mt) with mt in the expressions below. 
 
Unadjusted flow measure: The unadjusted flow measure (F0t) is simply the difference in the fund investment position 
data, aggregated across all funds investing in a particular country. We define the unadjusted flow measure as: 
10  ttt AAF  
Flow measure 1: This measure assumes that a fund flow is invested as a single lump sum amount at the end of the 
month. We define flow measure 1 as follows: 
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Flow measure 2: This measure assumes that the fund flow is invested as a lump sum amount at the beginning of a 
month. We define flow measure 2 as: 
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Flow measure 3: This measure assumes that the fund flow is invested as a lump sum amount at the middle of a month. 
We define flow measure 3 as: 
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Flow measure 4-6: Flow measures 4-6 assume that flows are distributed throughout the month at regularly spaced 
intervals. Measure 4 assumes that the fund flow is invested as two equal amounts, one half at the middle of a month, 
and the other half at the end of a month. Flow measure 5 assumes that a fund flow is invested in four equal 
amounts, one quarter each at the end of first, second, third and fourth weeks. Finally, flow measure 6 assumes that 
the flow amount is invested in equal amounts daily. For simplification, we assume there are 20 trading days in a 
month. In general, it can be shown be shown that flow measures 4 thru 6 can be characterized by: 
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Substituting n=2 in the above expression yields flow measure 4. Similarly, substituting n=4 in the above expression 
yields flow measure 5, and finally substituting n=20 in the above expression yields flow measure 6. 
 
  
 
 
Appendix F: Sources and description of independent variables 
This appendix describes the construction of the variables in our econometric tests of effects of rating changes and a 
brief description of the data sources.   
 
Emerging: An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a country is an emerging market and zero otherwise. The 
primary source for this variable is the Standard & Poors’ (S&P) Global Stock Markets 2003 Factbook. Three 
countries (Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan, and Vietnam) were not listed as either developed or emerging markets in 
the S&P Global Stock Markets 2003 Factbook. We classified these as emerging markets based on the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC)’s 2003 Annual Report and the Euromoney’s Internet Securities Inc (ISI) Emerging 
Markets website (http://www.securities.com).  
Comprehensive credit rating: A variable that takes a value from 0 to 21 as described in Appendix B, where a higher value 
indicates a stronger (e.g., investment grade) credit rating.  
Event: Absolute change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating of a country. 
Flow: The estimated flow of funds into a country, measured in millions of U.S. dollars as described in the text and in 
Appendix E.  
Common Law: An indicator variable that takes a value of one (and zero otherwise) if the legal origin of a country is 
identified as having an English common law system as tabulated in Appendix B of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1999).  
Rule of Law: A variable that takes a value from 0 to 6, where higher values indicate a higher tradition for law and 
order. The primary source for this variable is the rule of law variable from the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2002) dataset (http://www.som.yale.edu/Faculty/fl69/datasets/gbk_allvar.xls). For the ten countries in our 
sample with missing values, namely Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, 
Slovenia, and Tajikistan, we obtained the rule of law variable from Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000), and scaled it to 
be between 0 and 6. For example, the rule of law measure of 7 for Croatia from Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) 
which is based on a scale from 0 to 10, was converted to 4.20 to be based on a scale from 0 to 6.  
Crisis: An indicator variable that takes a value of one (and zero otherwise) if a sample observation is from a crisis 
period, such as the Asian (7:01:97- 3:31:98), Russian (8:01:98 - 12:31:98), Brazilian (1:01:99 - 3:31:99), Turkish 
(11:15:00 – 2:28:01), and the Argentinean (12:03:01 - 2:03:02) crises.  
Transparency: An indicator variable that takes a value of one (and zero otherwise) if a country has a low level of 
corruption, namely a score greater than 7.5 (on a scale of 0-10) in the Corruption Perceptions Index produced by 
Transparency International (http://www.corruption.org). Note that since we use data from each annual publication 
of the Index, the set of low corruption countries may change each year. 
Liquidity: Following Henry (2000), we calculate our liquidity as the value of shares traded divided by the stock market 
capitalization. The source for this variable is the Standard & Poors’ (S&P) Global Stock Markets 2003 Factbook 
which provides annual data for constructing this variable. Those countries not listed in the S&P Global Stock 
Markets 2003 Factbook (Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan, and Vietnam) were assigned missing values. 
GDP: The source for this variable, measured annually in current U.S. dollars is the World Economic Outlook 
Database (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/02/data/index.htm).   
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix G:  Asymmetric effects of rating changes (alternative definition of non-events) 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
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The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country i (the event country) at time t. 
Here, we report flow measure F6, which assumes the monthly flows were distributed in equal daily amounts 
throughout the month. For each country with a rating event, we include in the regressions flows in event months 
and flows in non-event months where there was no change in the comprehensive credit rating (event) of the same 
country. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing the flow measure) is based on a single-factor 
market model regression of the index returns of a country on the returns on a world index during an estimation 
period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an event month. Event is defined as the absolute 
change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating in country i. A positive rating event is defined 
as a positive change in the comprehensive credit rating from the prior month. A downgrade, or negative rating event, 
is defined as a decline in the comprehensive credit rating from the prior month. Regressions include variables for the 
lagged comprehensive credit rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal system (i.e., common law 
versus other forms), rule of law, GDP, liquidity, and an indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See 
Appendices E and F for a complete description of variable construction. The superscripts a, b, and c, imply statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using robust standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant 32.474 2.305b -25.982 -0.683 43.561 2.175b -83.905 -1.350 
Event 33.167 1.565 31.121 1.528 -87.428 -4.334a -79.245 -3.899a 
Comprehensive credit  -2.843 -2.535b 0.512 0.239 -3.848 -1.900c 0.793 0.366 
     rating (lagged) 
Emerging   57.737 2.289b   122.481 2.328b 
Common law   -26.651 -1.529   -4.864 -0.279 
Rule of law   -3.071 -0.636   -2.487 -0.514 
GDP   0.070 1.283   0.052 1.790c 
Liquidity   14.645 0.857   2.649 0.194 
Crisis   41.959 2.487b   33.538 1.743c 
Year Dummies no yes no yes 
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.031 0.007 0.038 
Observations 2468 2468 2327 2327 
 
  
 
Appendix H:  Asymmetric effects of rating changes (explicit flow measure 6, percent) 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
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The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country i (the event country) at time t. 
Here, we report the flow measure F6 deflated by the lagged country allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position 
cumulated across all funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that the monthly flows are distributed in 
equal daily amounts throughout the month. For each country with a rating event, we include in the regressions flows 
in event months and flows in non-event months where there was no change in the comprehensive credit rating 
(event) for any of the countries in our sample. The realized return for a country index is used in constructing the 
explicit flow measure. Event is defined as the absolute change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit 
rating in country i. A positive rating event is defined as a positive change in the comprehensive credit rating from the 
prior month. A downgrade, or negative rating event, is defined as a decline in the comprehensive credit rating from 
the prior month. Regressions include variables for the lagged comprehensive credit rating, country status as 
emerging/developed, origin of legal system (i.e., common law versus other forms), rule of law, GDP, liquidity, and 
an indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See Appendices E and F for a complete description of variable 
construction. The superscripts b and c indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels using robust standard 
errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant -0.014 -0.856 -0.083 -2.388b -0.015 -0.994 -0.019 -0.482 
Event 0.007 1.158 0.008 1.386 -0.021 -2.337b -0.021 -1.746c 
Comprehensive credit  0.001 1.214 0.001 0.568 0.002 1.809c 0.002 1.179 
     rating (lagged)        
Emerging   0.024 1.948c   0.011 0.535 
Common law   0.012 1.205   -0.003 -0.223 
Rule of law   0.007 1.294   -0.002 -0.377 
GDP   0.000 0.532   0.000 1.121 
Liquidity   -0.004 -0.792   0.004 1.021 
Crisis   -0.007 -0.511   -0.003 -0.139 
Year Dummies no yes no yes 
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.023 
Observations 252 252 270 270 
 
  
 
Appendix I:  Asymmetric effects of rating changes and transparency 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,6 ,,1, iXEventF ti
k
kktiti     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country i (the event country) at time t. 
Here, we report flow measure F6, which assumes that the monthly flows are distributed in equal daily amounts. For 
each country with a rating event, we include in the regressions flows in event months, and flows in non-event 
months where there was no change in the comprehensive credit rating (event) for any of the countries in our sample. 
Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the country’s corruption perceptions index (CPI) is greater than 
7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing the flow measure) is based on a single-
factor market model regression of the index returns of a country on the returns on a world index during an 
estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an event month. Event is defined as the 
absolute change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating in country i. A positive rating event is 
defined as an increase in the comprehensive credit rating, and a negative rating event occurs whenever the 
comprehensive credit rating declines from the prior month. Regressions include variables for lagged flow measure 
F6, the lagged comprehensive credit rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal system (i.e., 
common law versus other forms), rule of law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive variable formed from the 
Transparency and Event variables, and an indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See Appendices E and F 
for a complete description of variable construction. The superscripts a, b, and c, indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels using robust standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant -29.666 -0.199 -23.731 -0.158 320.876 1.902c 258.603 1.437 
Event -4.896 -0.221 -5.279 -0.239 -89.298 -3.269a -89.138 -3.282a 
Comprehensive credit  1.603 0.176 1.627 0.179 -1.027 -0.150 -1.430 -0.211 
     rating (lagged) 
Lagged Flow (F6t-1) -0.085 -0.534 -0.084 -0.531 0.262 3.382a 0.260 3.366a 
Emerging 37.816 0.549 24.783 0.360 -264.946 -2.283b -200.633 -1.610 
Common law -46.444 -0.615 -35.701 -0.535 -23.997 -0.381 -29.026 -0.470 
Rule of law 6.135 0.338 7.780 0.435 7.941 0.462 7.871 0.458 
GDP 0.224 1.095 0.232 1.133 -0.001 -0.011 0.014 0.280 
Transparency 58.572 0.574   -112.905 -1.018  
Transparency x Event -27.307 -0.107 3.799 0.015 244.276 2.033b 210.220 1.776c 
Liquidity 106.006 1.851c 104.091 1.816c 54.697 1.085 55.318 1.100 
Crisis 40.369 0.616 40.704 0.622 -103.963 -0.991 -102.845 -0.978 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.022 0.202 0.203 
Observations 240 240 253 253 
 
  
 
Appendix J:  Non-event country effects and transparency 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,6 ,1, jXEventF tj
k
kkttj     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country j (a non-event country) in 
month t with rating changes in event countries. Here, we report flow measure F6, which assumes that the monthly 
flows are distributed in equal daily amounts. For each rating event, we include in the regressions flows in the event 
months, and flows in non-event months. Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the country’s 
corruption perceptions index (CPI) is greater than 7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index (used in 
constructing the flow measure) is based on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country 
on the returns on a world index during an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 
represents an event month. Event is defined as the absolute aggregate change (from the previous month) in the 
comprehensive credit rating across all event countries i ( j). A positive rating event is defined as one if the aggregate 
ratings change is positive (and zero otherwise), and a negative rating event is defined as one if the aggregate ratings 
change is negative (and zero otherwise). Regressions include variables for lagged flow measure F6, the lagged 
comprehensive credit rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal system (i.e., common law versus 
other forms), rule of law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive variable formed from the Transparency and 
Event variables, and an indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See Appendices E and F for a complete 
description of variable construction. The superscripts a, b, and c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels using robust standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant -27.669 -0.611 -10.076 -0.226 42.370 0.701 36.481 0.634 
Event 3.618 0.655 1.708 0.313 5.368 1.105 6.053 1.257 
Comprehensive credit  -1.831 -0.725 -1.452 -0.575 -0.666 -0.218 -0.742 -0.241 
     rating (lagged) 
Lagged Flow (F6t-1) 0.042 0.664 0.041 0.656 0.116 2.002b 0.116 1.992b 
Emerging 67.662 2.165b 45.319 1.532 33.379 0.740 40.928 1.052 
Common law -32.991 -1.336 -20.773 -0.878 -51.838 -1.898c -56.424 -2.389b 
Rule of law 2.339 0.380 4.017 0.666 -6.272 -0.832 -6.975 -0.959 
GDP -0.011 -0.783 -0.010 -0.746 -0.008 -0.526 -0.008 -0.521 
Transparency 92.006 2.144b   -34.935 -0.658   
Transparency x Event -10.852 -0.817 4.952 0.431 26.639 2.090b 20.238 1.745c 
Liquidity -9.309 -0.434 -10.444 -0.489 7.123 0.358 7.529 0.378 
Crisis 95.113 4.236a 94.829 4.216a 6.883 0.265 6.095 0.235 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.034 0.055 0.056 
Observations 1352 1352 1356 1356 
 
  
 
Appendix K:  Asymmetric effects of rating changes and transparency (percent)  
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,)/6( ,,11,, iXEventCAF ti
k
kktititi     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country i (the event country) at time t. 
Here, we report flow measure F6 deflated by the lagged country allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position cumulated 
across all funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that the monthly flows are distributed in equal daily 
amounts. For each country with a rating event, we include in the regressions flows in event months, and flows in 
non-event months where there was no change in the comprehensive credit rating (event) for any of the countries in 
our sample. Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the country’s corruption perceptions index (CPI) is 
greater than 7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing the flow measure) is based 
on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country on the returns on a world index during 
an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an event month. Event is defined as 
the absolute change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating in country i. A positive rating 
event is defined as an increase in the comprehensive credit rating, and a negative rating event occurs whenever the 
comprehensive credit rating declines from the prior month. Regressions include variables for lagged flow measure F6 
(percent), the lagged comprehensive credit rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal system (i.e., 
common law versus other forms), rule of law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive variable formed from the 
Transparency and Event variables, and an indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See Appendices E and F 
for a complete description of variable construction. The superscript a indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
using robust standard errors in a two-tailed test that additionally account for clustering based on country of 
investment.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant 0.037 0.777 0.036 0.761 -0.003 -0.048 -0.008 -0.143 
Event 0.008 0.556 0.008 0.562 -0.055 -3.407a -0.055 -3.422a 
Comprehensive credit  -0.004 -1.835c -0.004 -1.847c -0.002 -0.821 -0.002 -0.846 
     rating (lagged)        
Lagged Flow (percent) 0.088 0.586 0.088 0.588 0.080 0.912 0.080 0.916 
Emerging 0.016 0.831 0.018 0.956 0.027 1.016 0.032 1.094 
Common law 0.024 1.363 0.023 1.493 0.021 1.172 0.020 1.168 
Rule of law 0.010 1.053 0.010 1.045 0.013 1.405 0.013 1.405 
GDP 0.000 -0.279 0.000 -0.296 0.000 1.333 0.000 1.525 
Transparency -0.007 -0.395   -0.010 -0.375   
Transparency x Event 0.012 0.215 0.008 0.140 0.122 3.752a 0.119 3.693a 
Liquidity -0.006 -0.441 -0.006 -0.432 -0.006 -0.779 -0.006 -0.775 
Crisis 0.025 0.791 0.025 0.791 -0.039 -1.339 -0.039 -1.337 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Clustering (country) yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.024 0.187 0.191 
Observations 240 240 253 253 
 
  
 
Appendix L:  Non-event country effects and transparency (percent)  
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,)/6( ,11,, jXEventCAF tj
k
kkttjtj     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country j (a non-event country) at time 
t. Here, we report flow measure F6, deflated by the lagged country allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position 
cumulated across all funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that the monthly flows are distributed in 
equal daily amounts. For each rating event, we include in the regressions flows in the event months, and flows in 
non-event months. Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the country’s corruption perceptions index 
(CPI) is greater than 7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing the flow measure) 
is based on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country on the returns on a world index 
during an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an event month. Event is 
defined as the absolute aggregate change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating across all 
event countries i ( j). A positive rating event is defined as one if the aggregate ratings change is positive (and zero 
otherwise), and a negative rating event is defined as one if the aggregate ratings change is negative (and zero 
otherwise). Regressions include variables for lagged flow measure F6 (percent), the lagged comprehensive credit 
rating, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal system (i.e., common law versus other forms), rule of 
law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive variable formed from the Transparency and Event variables, and an 
indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See Appendices E and F for a complete description of variable 
construction. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using robust 
standard errors in a two-tailed test that additionally account for clustering based on country of investment.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant -0.002 -0.086 0.005 0.161 0.030 1.278 0.028 1.156 
Event 0.000 -0.050 -0.001 -0.400 -0.001 -0.701 -0.001 -0.549 
Comprehensive credit  -0.003 -2.653b -0.003 -2.495b -0.003 -2.146b -0.003 -2.184b 
     rating (lagged) 
Lagged Flow (percent) -0.004 -0.058 -0.005 -0.062 0.067 1.329 0.068 1.344 
Emerging 0.023 2.348b 0.014 1.190 -0.006 -0.479 -0.003 -0.221 
Common law 0.012 1.806c 0.017 2.368b -0.004 -0.383 -0.006 -0.605 
Rule of law 0.008 2.316b 0.009 2.424b 0.009 1.928c 0.008 1.883c 
GDP 0.000 -0.579 0.000 -0.557 0.000 -0.322 0.000 -0.297 
Transparency   0.037 2.385b   -0.015 -1.025    
Transparency x Event -0.006 -1.698c 0.000 0.000 0.008 3.163a 0.006 2.058b 
Liquidity 0.001 0.297 0.001 0.163 0.002 0.517 0.002 0.575 
Crisis 0.033 3.455a 0.033 3.444a -0.002 -0.172 -0.002 -0.207 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Clustering (country) yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.031 0.030 0.030  
Observations 1352 1352 1356 1356  
 
  
 
Appendix M:  Asymmetric effects of rating changes and transparency (percent)  
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,)/6( ,,11,, iXEventCAF ti
k
kktititi     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country i (the event country) at time t. 
Here, we report flow measure F6 deflated by the lagged country allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position cumulated 
across all funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that the monthly flows are distributed in equal daily 
amounts. For each country with a rating event, we include in the regressions flows in event months, and flows in 
non-event months where there was no change in the comprehensive credit rating (event) for any of the countries in 
our sample. Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the country’s corruption perceptions index (CPI) is 
greater than 7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing the flow measure) is based 
on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country on the returns on a world index during 
an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an event month. Event is defined as 
the absolute change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating in country i. A positive rating 
event is defined as an increase in the comprehensive credit rating, and a negative rating event occurs whenever the 
comprehensive credit rating declines from the prior month. Regressions include variables for lagged flow measure F6 
(percent), the lagged comprehensive credit rating, an indicator variable for upgrade to or down grade from 
investment grade status, country status as emerging/developed, origin of legal system (i.e., common law versus other 
forms), rule of law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive variable formed from the Transparency and Event 
variables, and an indicator variable corresponding to crisis periods. See Appendices E and F for a complete 
description of variable construction. The superscript a indicates statistical significance at the 1% level using robust 
standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant 0.022 0.383 0.021 0.366 0.001 0.022 -0.003 -0.045 
Event 0.011 0.744 0.011 0.749 -0.057 -2.998a -0.057 -3.006a 
Comprehensive credit  -0.004 -1.191 -0.004 -1.197 -0.002 -0.936 -0.002 -0.954 
     rating (lagged)  
Up-dn from invgrade  -0.059 -1.850c -0.058 -1.839c 0.027 0.488 0.027 0.493 
Lagged Flow (percent) 0.094 0.735 0.094 0.739 0.079 1.167 0.079 1.171 
Emerging 0.021 0.790 0.023 0.905 0.026 0.817 0.031 0.772 
Common law 0.027 1.112 0.024 1.145 0.021 0.881 0.020 0.888 
Rule of law 0.010 1.112 0.010 1.084 0.013 1.456 0.013 1.458 
GDP 0.000 -0.266 0.000 -0.298 0.000 1.306 0.000 1.351 
Transparency -0.011 -0.348   -0.009 -0.318   
Transparency x Event 0.010 0.153 0.004 0.059 0.125 2.987a 0.122 3.174a 
Liquidity -0.007 -0.655 -0.006 -0.632 -0.006 -0.627 -0.006 -0.626 
Crisis 0.033 0.970 0.033 0.967 -0.038 -0.983 -0.038 -0.982 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.027 0.185 0.188  
Observations 240 240 253 253 
 
  
 
Appendix N:  Asymmetric effects of rating changes and transparency (percent)  
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the following equation: 
. ,)/6( ,,11,, iXEventCAF ti
k
kktititi     
The dependent variable is the change in mutual fund asset allocation levels in country i (the event country) at time t. 
Here, we report flow measure F6 deflated by the lagged country allocation (CA), i.e., fund asset position cumulated 
across all funds investing in a country. This measure assumes that the monthly flows are distributed in equal daily 
amounts. For each country with a rating event, we include in the regressions flows in event months, and flows in 
non-event months where there was no change in the comprehensive credit rating (event) for any of the countries in 
our sample. Transparency is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the country’s corruption perceptions index (CPI) is 
greater than 7.5 out of 10. The expected return for a country index (used in constructing the flow measure) is based 
on a single-factor market model regression of the index returns of a country on the returns on a world index during 
an estimation period of 60 months, i.e., from [-65,-6] where month 0 represents an event month. Event is defined as 
the absolute change (from the previous month) in the comprehensive credit rating in country i. A positive rating 
event is defined as an increase in the comprehensive credit rating, and a negative rating event occurs whenever the 
comprehensive credit rating declines from the prior month. Regressions include variables for lagged flow measure F6 
(percent), logistic transformation of the lagged comprehensive credit rating, country status as emerging/developed, 
origin of legal system (i.e., common law versus other forms), rule of law, GDP, transparency, liquidity, an interactive 
variable formed from the Transparency and Event variables, and an indicator variable corresponding to crisis 
periods. See Appendices E and F for a complete description of variable construction. The superscript a indicates 
statistical significance at the 1% level using robust standard errors in a two-tailed test.  
 
Positive rating events Negative rating events 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Constant 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.013 -0.014 -0.211 -0.019 -0.281 
Event 0.012 0.916 0.012 0.918 -0.056 -3.095a -0.055 -3.104a 
Comprehensive credit  -0.027 -1.895c -0.027 -1.912c -0.011 -1.004 -0.011 -1.021 
     rating (lagged-logistic) 
Lagged Flow (percent) 0.092 0.783 0.092 0.785 0.093 1.430 0.094 1.436 
Emerging 0.006 0.247 0.006 0.235 0.021 0.653 0.026 0.657 
Common law 0.025 1.041 0.026 1.165 0.016 0.698 0.016 0.697 
Rule of law 0.010 1.080 0.010 1.089 0.011 1.304 0.011 1.306 
GDP 0.000 -0.121 0.000 -0.115 0.000 1.316 0.000 1.375 
Transparency 0.002 0.068   -0.010 -0.384   
Transparency x Event 0.011 0.170 0.012 0.190 0.123 2.958a 0.120 3.118a 
Liquidity -0.006 -0.607 -0.006 -0.624 -0.006 -0.642 -0.006 -0.640 
Crisis 0.024 0.718 0.024 0.720 -0.041 -1.043 -0.041 -1.042 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.024 0.190 0.193  
Observations 245 245 261 261 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Sovereign Ratings Activity
(Number of ratings changes across all countries, by period)
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Figure 2: Positive Sovereign Ratings Activity
(Number of ratings changes across all countries, by period)
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Figure 3: Negative Sovereign Ratings Activity
(Number of ratings changes across all countries, by period)
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Figure 4:  Cumulative average abnormal returns of country index due 
to a positive ratings change
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Figure 5:  Cumulative average abnormal returns of country index due 
to a negative ratings change
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